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PREFACE 
Before I began this project, I knew very little about 
Eisenhower other than the old popular slogan, "We Like Ike." 
I had respected him for his achievements in World War II and 
naturally had concluded that he was an effective leader. On 
the other hand, I had also been aware that during his first 
term in off ice he had been heavily criticized for failing to 
do more for the peoples of Poland and Hungary when they 
revolted in 1956. In my research, I encountered both 
criticism and praise of Eisenhower and I would like to take 
time to review the trends in Eisenhower scholarship and 
define where I think my work fits. 
Although Eisenhower was elected to his first and second 
terms by overwhelming majorities over Adlai Stevenson, he 
was not without his critics. In 1956, Hans J. Morgenthau, 
Richard Rovere and Norman A. Graebner attacked Eisenhower 
for his lack of leadership and indecisiveness while in 
office. As Morgenthau wrote: the President's approach to 
foreign policy and international problems was "informed by a 
philosophy of abstention, conciliation and pacif ica-
i 
tion •.•• " 1 The list of Eisenhower detractors soon grew to 
include Marquis Childs, William V. Shannon, Emmet J. Hughes, 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and H. W. Brands to name just a 
few. Childs argued in his book, Eisenhower: Captive Hero; A 
Critical Study of the General and the President, that 
Eisenhower was unprepared for his position as President, was 
simplistic in his thinking, and his administration was a 
failure. 2 Brands labeled Eisenhower as being "slow to 
realize the import of revolutionary changes confronting 
America and unable to control the bureaucracy that made 
policy in his name. 113 The crux of this criticism centered 
on impressions of Eisenhower as failing to make decisions, 
allowing Dulles to determine American foreign policy single-
handedly, and merely reacting to events rather than 
understanding their larger context. Few could argue the 
1Quoted in Gary w. Reichard, "Eisenhower as President: 
The Changing View," South Atlantic Quarterly 77 (Summer 
1978): 267. This is an excellent summary of Eisenhower 
scholarship and contains a good bibliography. For works by 
these critics, see: Norman A. Graebner, The New 
Isolationism: A study in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 
1950 (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1956); Hans J. 
Morgenthau, "The Decline and Fall of America,n Foreign 
Policy," New Republic 135 (10 December 1956) arid "What the 
President and Mr. Dulles Don't Know," New Republic 135 (17 
December 1956); Richard Rovere, Affairs of State: The 
Eisenhower Years (New York, 1956). 
2Anthony James Joes, "Eisenhower Revisionism: The Tide 
Comes In," Presidential studies Quarterly 15 (Summer 1985): 
562. Also, see the Reichard article for works by the 
additional authors mentioned above. 
3H. W. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower 
and the National Insecurity state," American Historical 
Review 94 (October 1989): 962-63. 
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point that the liberation of the captive peoples of Eastern 
Europe failed to occur in 1956 -- something Eisenhower and 
Dulles through their rhetoric had led the American people to 
believe was an aim of their foreign policy. But was 
Eisenhower really an indecisive, uninvolved, and ineffective 
President who preferred to sit back and let others do his 
work for him? 
Eisenhower revisionists would argue no. As the Presi-
dent's papers in Kansas became available to historians, it 
soon became clear that his detractors really had little to 
stand on. Even Arthur Schlesinger had to admit that the 
Eisenhower papers altered the old picture of the president 
and wrote that Eisenhower had more energy, interest, cunning 
and command than many had earlier assumed. 4 The revision-
ists, such as Murray Kempton, Garry Wills, Richard Rhodes, 
Fred I. Greenstein, Robert A. Devine, Stephen E. Ambrose, 
Robert Branyon, Vincent P. Desantis, Blanche Weisen Cook, 
Barton Bernstein and Peter Lyon, went even further. They 
saw a "political genius" who had a "remarkable political 
instinct,"5 a man who ran his own administriiltion, set its 
goals, did not let Dulles set the foreign policy, and who 
emphasized his role as commander-in-chief rather than that 
4Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Ike Age Revisited," 
Reviews in American History 11 {March 1983): 6. 
5Reichard, "Eisenhower as President," South Atlantic 
Quarterly, 274, 275. Again, see his footnotes for 
revisionist articles. 
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of a partisan leader. Greenstein coined the phrase "hidden-
hand" to define Eisenhower's low-profile leadership style 
and built on Kempton's statement that "It was the purpose of 
his existence never to be seen in what he did."6 
Although low-profile, Eisenhower ran his own show and 
was at the center of events and decision-making. Steve Neal 
in his article, "Why We Were Right to Like Ike," credits 
Eisenhower with restoring confidence in the Presidency as an 
institution and says that finally historians know what the 
public knew all along: that he was neither passive nor 
detached. 7 Wills went further and wrote that it was "no 
mere accident that he remained, year after year, the most 
respected man in America. "8 As Eisenhower himself stated: 
"The United states never lost a soldier or a foot of ground 
in my administration. We kept the peace. People ask how it 
happened -- by God it didn't just happen. I'll tell you 
that."9 Desantis summed up Eisenhower's achievements 
according to the revisionists: "His Presidency will always 
7Steve Neal, "Why We Were Right to Like Ike," American 
Heritage 37 {December 1985}: 55. 
8Quoted in Reichard, "Eisenhower as President," South 
Atlantic Quarterly, 274. 
9Quoted in Stephen G. Rabe, "Eisenhower Revisionism: A 
Decade of Scholarhip," Diplomatic History {Winter 1993}: 
100. 
iv 
be associated with prosperity, abundance, and peace, no mean 
accomplishment for a military leader. 1110 
As to my own observations after completing my research, 
I have to agree with the revisionists. In the material 
available at the Eisenhower Library, it is impossible to 
find anything but an intelligent, well-informed, and master-
ful Eisenhower firmly in control of his administration. He 
was the one making the decisions, and it is clear from the 
information there that Dulles knew it too. The question for 
me then was why such an intelligent man who truly sought 
peace, could get into so much trouble over the word "libera-
tion." Clearly there was a gap between his rhetoric and the 
results, and this is what I address in my thesis. First, 
however, some foreign policy background. 
In 1947, George Kennan, Director of the Department of 
state's Policy Planning Staff, wrote an annonymous article 
in Foreign Affairs entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." 
He used this article to express his thinking on the objec-
tives of a country's foreign policy (to protect the security 
of the nation and to advance the welfare of T.he people) and 
noted that as "complete security or perfection of the inter-
national environment will never :Oe achieved," 11 equilibrium 
1
°vincent P. Desantis, "Eisenhower Revisionism," Review 
of Politics 38 (April 1976): 207. 
11Quoted in: John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of 
Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American 
National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982), 28. 
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needed to be maintained in the world so that one country or 
group of countries will never dominate it. When the public 
learned that Kennan had written the article, it assumed that 
he was making some sort of an official policy pronouncement 
and gave it the name containment as this word appeared in 
the article. From this rather odd beginning came what 
resulted in the Truman administration's policy toward the 
Soviet Union, one of containing its threac. 
John Foster Dulles, the foremost Republican spokesman 
on foreign policy and a consultant to the State Department, 
criticized containment. As early as December 1949, he wrote 
that the "eventual liberation" of countries under communist 
control ought to be "an essential and enduring part" of the 
foreign policy of the United States, but he advocated no 
specific action. He claimed that "there will develop 
pockets or centers of resistance" and "in light of what 
happens, further steps can be taken. " 12 Additionally, by 
1952, the bipartisanship of the early cold war period had 
dissolved and it was clear that foreign policy issues would 
be very important in the Presidential campa~gn. Dulles, 
possessing the skill of stating positions in attention-
getting terms, proclaimed the positive policy of liberation 
to be the one to defeat the Democrat's negative containment. 
12Quoted in: H. W. Brands, Cold Warriors; Eisenhower 1 s 
Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988), 9. 
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By May 1952, Dulles had outlined his plan for libera-
tion in an article in Life magazine. He claimed that if 
this plan was followed, a peaceful separation of these 
countries from Moscow could be achieved and that gains could 
be made against communism in general. He then went on to 
write a sentence that deserves more attention than it has 
received: "The local Communist parties would lose much of 
their vigor and belligerence as the Soviet Communist party 
became ever more preoccupied with its own "home work" of 
coping with the growing restiveness of the captive 
peoples. 1113 
This in a nutshell represents what I believe was actu-
ally the operating policy of Eisenhower's first administra-
tion. In this thesis I plan to show that although the term 
"liberation" was employed during the campaign, it was really 
used because Eisenhower found it to be a powerful word that 
brought him results. It was a call to action, appealed to 
people's morals, and it was just what Old Guard Republicans 
wanted to hear as it distanced them from the Democrats and 
Yalta. Additionally, it lured voters of Ea~tern European 
descent into the Republican camp and was a powerful psycho-
logical weapon against the Soviets. Although Eisenhower 
demanded that Dulles temper his calls for liberation with 
the word "peaceful" and make clear that the United States 
13John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," Life 32 
(19 May 1952): 157. 
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refused to call for bloody revolts in these captive 
countries, liberation was a cry that dominated his campaign. 
Once in office, one can clearly see that although 
liberation was hoped for, it was neither aggressively 
pursued nor achieved as actual policy. However, I argue 
that Eisenhower did more than return to Truman's containment 
-- something even the revisionists agree on. In the thesis 
that follows, I usually render the word "liberation" without 
benefit of quotation marks, as it is .·my contention that 
Dulles and Eisenhower did aspire to free the captive peoples 
of eastern Europe. This freedom was never viewed by the 
administration as a short-term goal, but it was hoped for. 
To my mind, "liberation" implies that it was mere rhetoric; 
I prefer to think the term had more substance behind it 
although it lacked immediacy. 
The substance behind the rhetoric can be found in the 
fact that Eisenhower outlined steps to create tensions 
within the soviet bloc in the hope of encouraging another 
Tito-like regime. He also planned to keep the Soviets so 
busy dealing with their internal problems th.at they would be 
unable to consolidate their power and use it in a more 
aggressive manner against the West. 
This thesis finds precedent in Dulles' Life article in 
which he wrote that he wanted to keep the Soviets preoc-
cupied with their own "home work" and if followed leads to 
the conclusion that in the case of Poland in 1956, Eisen-
viii 
hower and Dulles could claim victory. Gomulka at that time 
appeared to offer hope of a second regime along the Tito 
model and he had indeed kept the Soviets preoccupied. 
Poland is a good case study of libertation as it proved the 
success of a policy many believe did not exist. Zbigniew 
Brzezinski agreed with this conclusion in his work, The 
Soviet Bloc; Unity and Conflict. He wrote that the Polish 
revolt succeeded because 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
it was preceeded by a gradual and continual 
dissolution of Stalinism in Poland 
the power was held by the Party which executed the 
change of power to Gomulka 
as the power was given to Gomulka, the revolt was 
given a Polish nationalist self-assertion element 
Gomulka proposed domestic reform without chailenging 
areas of Soviet sensitivity (membership in tije bloc 
and the rule of the Party) ~ 
the pattern of Polish events paralleled some of 
those in Yugosla~ia in 1948, so the soviets took the 
path of least resistanceM 
As Brzezinski further stated: the significance of Poland 
" ••. meant that the USSR was ..• moving toward a greater 
realization that its leadership in the camp required a more 
equitable adjustment between Soviet interests and those of 
other members. 1115 The conclusion would then be that 
diversity in the bloc would ultimately lead to disunity and 
a victory for the West. 16 
14Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc; Unity and 
Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 362-
63. 
15Ibid., 265. 
16Ibid., 268. 
ix 
As more information is declassified at the Eisenhower 
Library, I believe my thesis will be upheld. If the 
revisionists truly believe that Eisenhower was a "political 
genius," then how could he have failed so miserably with 
liberation? What they need to do is to take a closer look 
at liberation and see behind the term to the substance. 
Thus, although a gap appeared between the President's words 
and results, this gap is explained when his true aims are 
revealed (in NSC 174). As John Gaddis pointed out, 
Eisenhower could not publicize what he was doing; to do so 
would only destroy those opportunities he was seeking to 
exploit. 17 
17John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace; Inquiries Into the 
History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1987), 175. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As World War II was drawing to a close, the leaders of 
the "Grand Alliance" against Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, 
American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet dictator Joseph 
Stalin met at Yalta on 4 February 1945 to discuss postwar 
Europe. 18 In particular, they sought solutions to the 
problem of what forms a defeated Germany and a liberated 
Poland would take, and they explored the possibility of 
creating an international organization to take the place of 
the ineffective League of Nations. A state·.ment issued on 11 
18For further information on Yalta, see Russell D. 
Buhite, Decisions at Yalta. An Appraisal of summit Diplomacy 
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., ~986}; Diane 
Shaver Clemens, Yalta (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1970); Richard F. Fenno, The Yalta Conference (Boston: 
Heath, 1955); Jan Karski, The Great Powers and Poland 1919-
1945. from Versailles to Yalta (Lanham, MD: University Press 
of America, Inc., 1985); John L. Snell, The Meaning of 
Yalta; Big Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956); 
Edward Reilly Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians; The 
Yalta Conference (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1949); Cyrus 
Leo Sulzberger, such a Peace: The Roots and Ashes of Yalta 
(New York: Continuum, 1982); Athan G. Theoharis, The Yalta 
Myths: An Issue in United States Politics, 1945-1955 
(Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1970). 
1 
February outlined the decision of these three men to occupy 
Germany when the war was over, to hold free elections in 
Poland, and to meet at San Francisco to create the future 
United Nations. Although no such agreement was made at 
Yalta, it had been attributed by cold war politicians and 
historians as being the place where the world was divided 
2 
into two increasingly antagonistic camps, the Western one 
and the soviet one. 19 
The root of this accusation lies with the decisions 
made concerning Poland. At Yalta, the "Big Three" promised 
that Poland would regain its independence and that free 
elections were to be held there with democratic and anti-
Nazi parties. The problem with these promises was that the 
wording was vague and open to interpretation. Unfortunate-
ly, the Yalta Conference provided no firm safeguards to 
ensure that "independent" and "free" were defined in western 
terms. As a result, the Soviet Union, whose army was 
already present in Poland, had its own concept of what 
constituted an independent country and free ~lections. The 
Soviet Union used Yalta's vague wording to its advantage, 
defining "democratic" and "anti-Nazi" parties as those which 
cooperated with the communists; thus, the elections on 19 
January 1947 were controlled by the Soviets and a Soviet 
19see, inter alia, Snell, The Meaning of Yalta; Big 
Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power; Sulzberger, 
Such a Peace: The Roots and Ashes of Yalta. 
puppet government was installed in Poland, enslaving 
millions of people in a communist system.w 
Poland and squabbles over occupied Germany increased 
the tensions between East and West. The United states 
slowly began to view the Soviets as being expansionist 
especially as Western concern about the civil war in Greece 
grew. Great Britain had maintained a military presence in 
3 
2
°For further reading on Polish history: Mary Craig, 
Lech Walesa and His Poland (New York: Continuum, 1987); 
Norman Davies, God's Playground, a History of Poland (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Norman Davies, Heart 
of Europe: a Short History of Poland (New York: Clarendon 
Press, 1984); M.K. Dziewanowski, Poland in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Timothy 
Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity (New York: 
Scribner's, 1984}; Oskar Halecki, A History of Poland (New 
York: Roy Publishers, 1956); Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, Pilsudski: 
A Life for Poland introduction by Zbigniew Brzezinski (New 
York: Hippocrene Books, 1982); Jakub Karpinski, Countdown, 
the Polish Upheavals of 1956, 1968, 1971. 1976, 1980, 
translated by Olga Amsterdamska and Gene M. Moore (New York: 
Karz-Cohl, 1982); R.F. Leslie, Reform and Insurrection in 
Russian Poland, 1856-1865 (Newport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1969); Flora Lewis, A Case History of Hope: the Story of 
Poland's Peaceful Revolutions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1958); Stanislaw Mikolajcze1~, The Rape of Poland; Pattern 
of Soviet Aggression (New York: Whittlesey House, 1948); 
William Richard Morfill, Poland (New York: GP Putnam's Sons, 
1893); W.F. Reddaway, et al, eds., The Cambridge History of 
Poland (New York: Octagon Books, 1971); Richard Felix Staar, 
Poland 1944-1962: The Sovietization of a Captive People 
(Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Universtiy Press, 1962); 
Konrad Syrop, Poland: Between the Hammer and the Anvil 
(London: Hale, 1968); Konrad Syrop, Spring in October: The 
Story of the Polish Revolution, 1956 (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1976); A.E. Tennant, studies in Polish Life 
and History (London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1924); Piort s. 
Wandycz, The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974); Richard M. 
Watt, Bitter Glory: Poland and its Fate 1918 to 1939 (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1982); Adam Zamoyski, The Polish 
Way: A Thousand Year History of the Poles and their Culture 
(New York: Franklin watts, 1988). 
Greece and was helping it to fight communist rebels who 
threatened the local government, but when Great Britain 
announced in late 1946 its intent to leave Greece, the 
United states became concerned not only about Greece, but 
also about Turkey as well. If Greece fell to the 
communists, Turkey would be surrounded by non-democratic 
countries. 
This concern led President Harry s. Truman to initiate 
the Truman Doctrine on 12 March 1947. This policy, aimed 
first and foremost at Greece and Turkey, offered American 
aid to any free nation resisting communist propaganda or 
sabotage. It was the first instance of postwar inter-
4 
national resistance to communist aggression. Besides Greece 
and Turkey, the Truman administration was concerned about 
the post-war economic recovery of Europe. Advocating a 
policy of collective defense Truman proposed the Marshall 
Plan, which became effective April 1948 when the United 
States offered massive aid to 17 European countries. 
Besides helping these countries to recover, ,he also hoped to 
bring them into the Western orbit. The Marshall Plan was a 
four-year program in which $13.3 billion was given to 
Europe. with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the 
world cemented into two camps and the American policy of 
containment took effect. 21 
21see preface for more on containment. Also, Robert J. 
Donovan has written two volumes on the Truman Years: 
conflict and Crisis, The Presidency of Harry s. Truman 1945-
5 
Containment was a policy designed to keep communists 
from expanding their influence in the world. An important 
year in East-West relations, 1949, found the West threatened 
by a strengthening Eastern sphere. The soviet Union 
exploded its first atomic bomb on 29 August, and in China a 
communist government came to power on 1 October. In Korea, 
the United States and the Soviet Union could not agree on 
what type of provisional government should be set up, so 
Truman refused to withdraw American troops. He felt it 
better to have a Western presence in the country than to 
leave it open to a probable communist takeover. With the 
increased militarization and tension in Korea, war 
eventually broke out in June 1950. As the conflict dragged 
on, growing discontent with the Korean War and with the 
Democratic administration's policy of containment, which 
appeared to achieve little while costing much, helped Dwight 
David Eisenhower, already a popular war hero and advocate of 
a policy of liberation to win the presidential election in 
1952.n 
President Eisenhower was in off ice during an important 
1948 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1977); Tumultuous 
Years, The Presidency of Harry s. Truman 1949-1953 (New 
York: w. w. Norton & Co., Inc., 1982). 
nJohn w. Spanier, American Foreiqn Policy Since World 
War II, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1962), 103; Stephen E. 
Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy 1938-
1970 (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971), 218. 
6 
time period in terms of East-West relations. Events ranging 
from Stalin's death in 1953 to the Polish riot of 1956 in 
Poznan offered chances for a reduction in world tensions and 
for a possible decrease in soviet power in the Eastern 
European countries. Eisenhower ran for the presidency in 
1952 with such aims on his platform, and he espoused the 
cause of "liberation" for the Soviet satellites. Some 
critics believe that Eisenhower failed in his plans for 
liberation, 23 but this work aims to show through the 
examination of National Security Council papers that 
"liberation" was more a cry used to gain public support for 
Eisenhower's policies vis-a-vis the communist world, rather 
than the immediate goal. Eisenhower wanted these satellite 
countries and their people to assert their own national 
customs, traditions, and identities, and by these means to 
maximize Soviet difficulties by resisting domination. If 
the Soviet Union could not consolidate its power in this 
area, it could not then use this power against the West. 
During the Presidential campaign, John Foster Dulles, 
Eisenhower's advisor and future Secretary of State, argued 
that liberation was designed to take advantage of 
situations in various parts of the world which afford 
those of dynamic purpose the opportunity peacefully to 
set up strains and stresses within the Soviet-dominated 
world which will preoccupy the rulers with home 
nsee preface for more details. 
problems and gradually disintegrate and shrink their 
control. ••• 24 
Early in 1953 Eisenhower began working on "creating 
problems" for the Soviets, and the first months of his 
presidency were busy. He formed the Committee on 
International Information Activities to study the United 
States' use of propaganda in presenting itself and its 
policies to the world, and he tried to persuade Congress to 
pass a resolution on captive peoples. Two events in 1953, 
7 
however, caught the administration off guard and with no 
idea of how to respond: one was the death of Stalin in March 
1953, the other the pro-democratic riots in East Germany 
three months later. Eisenhower, surprised to find the 
United states had no contingency plans for such events, 
directed the National Security Council to formulate 
guidelines concerning American policy toward the Soviet 
Union and its puppet politicians. The results were NSC 158 
and NSC 174, outlines that would guide American foreign 
policy for the next three years. 
NSC 158, created as an immediate response to Stalin's 
death and to the riots in East Germany on 29 June 1953, was 
merely an interim plan on how to exploit soviet vulnerabil-
ities; it focused on psychological, and not diplomatic, 
objectives. NSC 174, formulated on 11 December 1953, was 
the most important policy statement made during Eisenhower's 
24Quoted in "Containment and Liberation," The 
Commonweal, 6 February 1953, 442. 
first administration and was the key to interpreting the 
success or failure of the president's policies through the 
end of 1956. In it liberation was determined to be a long-
term goal; the short-term goal was to create disequilibrium 
in the Soviet sphere. Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, 
8 
and other similar organizations carried out humanitarian aid 
programs and propaganda campaigns, as they could be effec-
tive means of increasing satellite national sentiments and 
thus problems for the Soviet Union.~ 
Official relations between the Polish and American 
governments were formally correct at best and frequently 
full of mutual recriminations. Diplomatic negotiations 
produced little or no results, so propaganda became the most 
effective method of promoting resistance to soviet 
domination. Unfortunately, with propaganda a policy's 
effectiveness is impossible to measure concretely. Not 
until the Poznan riot on 28 June 1956 did the United States 
know for sure that its efforts had been at least in part 
successful. The riots proved to the world that the Poles 
hated the presence of the soviets in their country and that, 
given an opportunity, they would not accept without question 
all directives handed down from Moscow. 
~Robert T. Holt and Robert van de Velde, Strategic 
Psycoloqical Operations and American Foreign Policy 
(Chicago: Universtiy of Chicago Press, 1960); U.S. Policy 
Toward Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe, 11 December 
1953, Box 8, NSC Series, Office of the Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs. 
The difficulties in Poznan began when the workers 
protested their economic conditions and poor standard of 
living; the trouble arose when the protest turned to anti-
communist, anti-Russian, and pro-freedom slogans and turned 
9 
to violence. The riots could be interpreted as a failure of 
American liberation policy as Poland remained a communist 
country. This conclusion is incorrect. By the aims of NSC 
174, the riot was a success. It demonstrated the desire of 
the Poles to be free from Soviet control. Propaganda 
efforts by the United States had kept hope alive and resis-
tance firm. The riots in Poland forced a change from a 
Polish regime dominated by Moscow to a more "liberal" 
government run by communist Poles who thought that Polish 
national interests should play a role in determining Polish 
governmental policy. 26 
Although still a soviet "satellite," Poland had taken 
the first steps to loosen the grip of the Kremlin. This 
liberalization and resistance to sovietization proved a 
partial victory for Eisenhower's policy toward Eastern 
Europe and not its failure. There now existed some 
disequilibrium in the Soviet sphere and the Soviets were 
further from, and not closer to, consolidating their power. 
The Poles now had a government that could address national 
issues and characteristics. The Poles took a stand against 
26See chapter four. Also sec Brzezinski, The Soviet 
Bloc: Unity and Conflict, 262-63. 
sovietization and Eisenhower's policy of liberation made a 
step forward and away from the old policy of containment. 
10 
I. LIBERATION 
During the 1952 presidential campaign, Adlai E. Steven-
son ran as a reluctant Democratic candidate against Dwight 
D. Eisenhower. Stevenson aspired to a second term as 
governor of Illinois but was coerced into running for the 
presidency as there were few other candidates willing to 
stand against the popular war hero. Stevenson was known for 
his oratory, but he ran into difficulty as he found himself 
continually defending the unpopular policies of fellow 
Democrat Truman. The Democrats claimed to have worked for 
peace and to have ended the tragic era of isolationism of 
the Republicans prior to World War II, but the Democratic 
administration was the one that involved the United states 
in Korea. 
Eisenhower, a favorite of liberal and moderate Republi-
cans, was chosen to run over the conservative and 
isolationist Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio. Eisenhower 
possessed a wider appeal within his own party and he 
criticized Roosevelt and Truman for their "usurpation of 
11 
12 
executive power."27 Eisenhower wanted to increase Congress' 
activities and to put an end to the costly and unpopular 
Korean War. The Republicans also possessed a powerful 
weapon during the election: the flamboyant, then junior 
senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy. McCarthy, 
unleashed against the Democrats and their past years in 
power, tried to link Stevenson with Moscow. Campaigning in 
his home state, McCarthy stated: "If somebody would only 
smuggle me aboard the Democratic campaign special with a 
baseball bat in hand, I'd teach patriotism to little Ad-
lie. 1128 McCarthy added spice to the campaign trail and 
appealed to people's frustration with the complexity of the 
Cold War, but the Republicans won based upon Eisenhower and 
his own personal appeal and policies. 
During the 1952 presidential campaign, Eisenhower 
called on the expertise of John Foster Dulles29 and the two 
espoused the policy of liberation of the East European 
satellite countries and exploited the public's frustration 
with the Democratic Party's policy of containment. 
Eisenhower and Dulles claimed that Presidents Roosevelt and 
27Quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 2, The 
Presidency (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 56. 
28Quoted in Fred J. Cook, The Nightmare Decade, The Life 
and Times of Senator Joe McCarthy (New York: Random House, 
1971) I 6. 
~Dulles was the foremost Republican spokesman on 
foreign policy, a consultant to the State Department, a one-
time UN delegate, and a participant of many international 
conferences. 
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Truman had sold out Eastern Europe by traeing victory in 
World War II for a new enemy and new oppressors in the form 
of the Soviet Union. The Republican Party saw containment 
as a policy failure, regarding it as a negative policy that 
aimed at preserving the status quo; in their view, 
containment surrendered the initiative to the enemy, was 
costly, could possibly bankrupt the country, and merely 
reacted to counter Communist danger wherever and whenever 
the communists chose to attack. 30 Additionally, contain-
ment, aiming to halt the spread of communism, did little for 
the peoples of Eastern Europe already under Soviet domina-
tion. 
During the campaign, Dulles called containment 
"negative, futile, and immoral," and noted that the aim of 
foreign policy was not to coexist indefinitely with the 
Communist menace, but to eliminate it. In his view, this 
could be accomplished with a "psychological and political 
offensive. 1131 What the Republican platform offered was a 
new and positive policy: 
We maintain that man was not born to be ruled, but that 
he consented to be governed; ••• It will be made clear, on 
the highest authority of the President and the Congress, 
that United States policy, as one of its peaceful pur-
poses, looks happily forward to the genuine independence 
30spanier, American Foreign Policy, 104. This viewpoint 
can also be seen in the Republican Party Platform of 1952 
in: Donald Bruce Johnson, ed., National Party Platforms, 
vol. 1, 1941-1956, 2d ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1978}, 497. 
31Spanier, American Foreign Policy, 104. 
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of those captive peoples •••• we shall again make liberty 
into a beacon light of hope that will penetrate the dark 
places. 32 
Dulles felt that according to this plan, American foreign 
policy would be based on spiritual values such as those 
expressed by Abraham Lincoln, who, on his way to be 
inaugurated in Washington, D.C., said of the Declaration of 
Independence, "To me this declaration means liberty, not 
alone to the people of this country·, but hope for the world, 
for all future time. 1133 Ideas would become weapons and the 
United States would be the hope of all peoples and the 
despair of all aggressors.~ United States policy would 
stand for a righteous cause. As Dulles later stated in 
1965: 
Our foreign policy can't divorce itself from our 
belief that each individual has his origin and destiny 
in God and enjoys a spiritual nature and personal 
dignity. we must therefore oppose those who treat the 
individual as an animated bit of matter to promote the 
domination of the world by atheistic rulers. 
Moral principles are, or should be, applicable to 
governments as well as to individuals. Violation of 
these principles inevitably brings suffering and loss. 
Men and nations both must try to follow a righteous 
course. 35 
32Johnson, National Party Platforms, 496-99. 
33Quoted in: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., The 
Dynamics of World Power; A Documentary History of United 
States Foreign Policy. 1945-73, vol. 2, Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union (New York: Chelsea House, 1973), 466. 
~Spanier, American Foreign Policy, 104. 
35Andrew H. Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: 
D. van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1965), 102. 
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One of Eisenhower's campaign speeches broadcast over 
Radio Free Europe to the Iron curtain countries in October 
1952 illustrates the party platform: 
I am grateful for the opportunity Radio Free Europe 
gives me today to address a message to the millions of 
friendly people now held captive under the dictatorship 
of Moscow. I have more to say to you than a mere person-
al greeting and expression of my understanding for your 
hardships of the present. 
I am speaking to you as an individual American citi-
zen. However, I believe I am qualified to tell you some-
thing of what is in the hearts and minds of the over-
whelming majority of Americans. For in recent weeks it 
has been my privilege to travel tens of thousands of 
kilometers in my country, talking to people in every 
walk of life and of every economic condition. I have 
found them disagreeing with one another on many impor-
tant questions that affect our own political life at 
home. This is an old and honored American politi~al 
custom. But there is one matter of national policy on 
which I find them almost unanimously agreed. That is 
that Americans want to live truly in peace with the 
world. But they believe that true peace is not a 
possibility so long as other peoples who have been 
accustomed to their own freedom are deprived of it. The 
peace we now have is not enough. We in the new world 
will never feel entirely secure in our homes until 
security had been restored to you in yours. That is why 
Americans, although they differ on other subjects, join 
willingly in giving their support to the peaceful 
strengthening of the growing alliance among free nations 
of the West. 
May the time come when the words memorized by all 
young Americans--"with liberty and justice for all"--
will be true of all peoples throughout the world who 
wish to rule themselves. God Bless You. 36 
This is one of many examples of Eisenhower's messages of 
hope to captive peoples. In addition to the positive and 
36Statement Broadcast Over Radio Free Europe to Iron 
Curtain Countries, 3 October 1952, Box 2, Stephen Benedict, 
Collection of Materials re: General Eisenhower's 1952 
Campaign Speeches. 
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moral policy of liberation, the Republicans, during the 
campaign, also proposed massive retaliation and mutual 
security. These were more dynamic policies than contain-
ment, and focused on action as opposed to reaction. The 
idea behind liberation and massive retaliation was to keep 
tqe threat of the Soviet Union at bay, while the West would 
be strengthened into a united bloc through the policies of 
mutual security. The American people's dissatisfaction with 
the past policies, coupled with these promises of action, 
served to elect Eisenhower, an already popular man who had 
proven himself in Europe in the past and who offered hope 
for a new and better future. 37 
Once in office,-Eisenhower and Dulles, the new 
Secretary of State, began to explore all possible avenues 
for turning campaign rhetoric into reality. Testifying 
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the 
topic of "Communism, Containment and Global strategy," 
Dulles once again denounced containment as an unsound policy 
and stated that it was bound to fail because a defensive 
policy never won against an aggressive policy. In his view, 
liberation was an aggressive policy and the hope of 
liberation was to be kept alive without provoking a general 
war: "It must be and can be a peaceful process, but those 
who do not believe that results can be accomplished by moral 
pressures, by the weight of propaganda, just do not know 
37Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 218. 
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what they are talking about. 1138 
In his Inaugural Address, Eisenhower announced his 
first proposal for action on the liberation issue. He 
declared that America would "never acquiesce in the 
enslavement of any people in order to purchase fancied gain 
for ourselves." He asked Congress to join him in "an 
appropriate resolution making clear that this Government 
recognizes no kind of commitment contained in secret 
understandings of the past with foreign governments which 
permit this kind of slavery. 1139 The futility of appease-
ment was apparent and never again would the United States 
trade honor for security.~ These transparent references to 
Yalta again accused the Democrats of allowing the peoples of 
Eastern Europe to be enslaved by the Soviet Union. 
The new President's proposal for a resolution on 
captive peoples received a positive response from Congress, 
so much so that by the end of January, five resolutions had 
been introduced on this topic. On 26 January 1953, in 
keeping with his campaign promise of more vigorous psycho-
logical warfare, Eisenhower created the President's 
38Quoted in Schlesinger, Dynamics of World Power, 465. 
39United states Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Inaugural Adddress (Washington, D.C.: GPO 1953), 167. 
4011 Proclaiming Our Faith Anew: Inaugural Address of 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower," The Department of state 
Bulletin, 2 February 1953, 167; see also JanP.t Podell and 
Steven Anzovin, eds., Speeches of the American Presidents 
(New York: H.W. Wilson Co., 1988), 565. 
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Committee on International Information Activities. William 
H. Jackson, one-time Deputy Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, headed the committee that was instructed to 
"survey and evaluate the government's information and 
related policies and activities with particular interest to 
international relations and national security" and to 
present its report by 30 June 1953. 41 Eisenhower stressed 
the group's importance to his strategy by stating to the 
press that a "unified and dynamic effort in this field is 
essential to the security of the United States and of other 
peoples in the community of free nations. 1142 
The United states government was not the only organi-
zation involved in psychological warfare for the liberation 
of the East European satellites. The National Committee for 
a Free Europe, created on 2 June 1949 by private individu-
als, aimed to conduct a propaganda campaign against the 
communist-dominated satellites and do things an official 
government agency could not do. It attempted to support 
exiles from these countries by finding jobs .for them, aiding 
them in publishing their articles and distributing them to 
their homelands, analyzed and indexed new Soviet laws, 
provided Congress with information on developments in the 
4111 International Information Activities Committee 
Appointed," The Department of State Bulletin, 9 February 
1953, 217. 
4211President' s Plan," New York Times, 27 January 1953, 
14. 
Soviet orbit, sponsored lecture tours, and created study 
centers. This committee, however, became famous for 
creating Radio Free Europe which first broadcast 4 July 
1950. 43 
Seeking to preserve "the Western democratic tradition 
19 
in Eastern Europe," Radio Free Europe promoted "counterrevo-
lution through seduction--the prospect of American material 
culture, fashion, commodities--and through fear--the 
prospect of an enslaving, death-dealing communism. 1144 It 
was a genuinely patriotic "home service" radio for satellite 
peoples with the political goal of contributing to their 
peaceful liberation. 45 Radio Free Europe, ostensibly 
created to provide jobs for exiles, was actually created to 
perform tasks that an official government agency could not. 
Radio Free Europe's radio broadcasts could conduct a propa-
ganda campaign against six communist-dominated satellite 
countries in central and eastern Europe and the United 
states government could not Le held officially responsible 
for the contents of the broadcasts. The Central Intelli-
gence Agency, not unaware of the advantages Radio Free 
43 Robert T. Holt, Radio Free Europe (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1958); James L. Tyson, United 
States International Broadcasting and National Security (New 
York: Ramapo Press, 1983); Sig Mickelson, America's Other 
Voice, The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (New 
York: Praeger, 1983). 
44Blanche Weisen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1981), 128-29. 
45Holt, Strategic Psychological Operations, 206. 
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Europe provided the United states in its propaganda warfare 
against the Soviet Union, secretly channelled funds to the 
"private" station through State Department guidance. 46 The 
President's newly formed Committee on International Informa-
tion Activities would address such issues as coordinating 
the efforts of the official government radio station, Voice 
of America, with those of the private Radio Free Europe. 
Now that the West had the ability to pierce the Iron 
curtain, at least with radio signals, it was looking for 
ways to turn harassment of regimes and morale boosting into 
actual liberation. 
On 2 February 1953, during his first State of the Union 
Address, Eisenhower recalled that with victory in 1945 
Americans had anticipated a world of peace and cooperation; 
instead, there now existed a world of turmoil: 
From this costly experience we have learned one clear 
lesson. We have learned that the free world cannot in-
definitely remain in a posture of paralyzed tension. To 
do so leaves forever to the aggressor the choice of time 
and place and means to cause greatest hurt to us at 
least cost to himself •••• This administration has, there-
fore, begun the definition of a new pos~tive foreign 
policy. 47 
For Eisenhower this foreign policy had to be clear, 
consistent, and confident, global, envision all peaceful 
~o read more on Radio Free Europe, refer to footnote 
40 as well as Holt, Strategic Psychological Operations. 
47Quoted in: Fred L. Israel , ed. , -=T=h==e.........,S:::-t=a=t=e-"o""'f ___ t"""h"'"e=-=U=n=i==o~n 
Messages of the Presidents; 1790-1966, vol. 3, with an 
introduction by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (New York: 
Chelsea House, 1967), 3012-13. 
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methods and devices, foster the advent of practical unity in 
Europe, recognize the importance of world trade, and stress 
mutual security as one country could not defend the liberty 
of all nations. The hope of freedom depended on Americ3n 
strength, heart and wisdom, strength in arms, and spiritual 
resources. 48 Eisenhower's address signalled the official 
beginning of the new administration's psychological 
offensive against the Kremlin and its allies. The United 
States would now take the initiative in the Cold War, a role 
reversal from the Truman years. Eisenhower appeared to be 
f~lf illing his promise of action and his administration was 
gaining momentum and it was only the beginning of February. 
Encouraged, Eisenhower continued with his plans. The 
resolution he proposed in his inaugural speech gained a more 
concrete form in February and became known as the Declara-
tion on Captive Peoples. 49 The United States declared that 
it would never agree to the enslavement of others for gain. 
·rhe declaration recalled past international agreements 
(Yalta), pointed out the Soviet leaders' vi~lation of them 
(no free elections in Poland), and noted that the United 
states had never agreed to such violations or results. The 
United States expected the Soviets to live up to the 
48Ibid. I 3025. 
49Eisenhower sent a letter and his proposed draft of the 
resolution to Vice-President Richard M. Nixon and Speaker of 
the House Joseph w. Martin, Jr., on 20 February 1953. 
agreements and to keep the peace. The text of the draft 
resolution Eisenhower sent to the House read as follows: 
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WHEREAS, During World War II, representatives of the 
United States, during the course of secret conferences, 
entered into various international agreements or under-
standings concerning other peoples; and 
WHEREAS, The leaders of the Soviet Communist Party, 
who now control Russia, have, in violation of the clear 
intent of these agreements or understandings, subjected 
the peoples concerned, including whole nations, to the 
domination of a totalitarian imperialism; and 
WHEREAS, Such forcible absorption of free peoples 
into an aggressive despotism increases the threat 
against the security of all remaining free peoples; and 
WHEREAS, The people of the United States, true to 
their traditional heritage of freedom, are never 
acquiescent in such enslavement of any peoples; and 
WHEREAS, It is appropriate that the Congress join 
with the President in giving expression to the desires 
and hopes of the people of the United States: Therefore 
be it 
RESOLVED, that the Senate and House concurring, 
JOIN with th·· President in declaring that the United 
States rejects any interpretation or applications of any 
international agreements or understandings, made during 
the course of World War II, which have been perverted to 
bring about the subjugation of free peoples, and further 
JOIN in proclaiming the hope that the peoples who 
have been subjected to the captivity of Soviet despotism 
shall again enjoy the right of self-determination within 
a framework which will sustain the peace; that they 
shall again have the right to choose the form of 
government under which they will live, and that 
sovereign rights of self-government shall be restored to 
them all in accordance with the pledge of the Atlantic 
Charter. 50 
Dulles felt strongly about this resolution, claiming 
that it had two purposes: to "register dramatically" the 
breaches by the soviet Union of wartime agreements; and to 
"register equally dramatically the desire and hope of the 
American people that the captive peoples shall be 
5011 Liberation of Captive Peoples," The Department of 
State Bulletin, 2 March 1953, 353-54. 
liberated. 1151 On 26 February he told the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Affairs that: 
The captive peoples are oppressed by a great fear 
23 
that at some future time the United States may agree to 
a partition of the world whereby we would accept and 
support Soviet dictatorship of alien peoples in the 
hope of gaining greater security for ourselves. 52 
With these statements Dulles condemned the policy of the 
past, containment, and offered the hope of liberation. He 
continued: "We do not accept or tolerate captivity as an 
irrevocable fact which can be finalized by force or by the 
lapse of time."" Eisenhower and Dulles were careful, 
however, not to repudiate Yalta as this would jeopardize 
America's rights in Vienna and Berlin. 
For the anti-communist Poles, the resolution on captive 
peoples had a profound effect; it was a promise of libera-
tion and provided a measure of hope for the future. They 
had not been deserted by the West as they had feared. 
Charles Douglas Jackson, a member of William Jackson's 
Committee on International Information Activities and a 
special assistant to the President, receiveq a note from 
Radio Free Europe to the effect that the number of letters 
the station received from Poland had increased dramatically 
51Bennett Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation, East-Central 
Europe in United states Diplomacy and Politics Since 1941 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 123. 
52united states Senate, Executive Sessions of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 26 
February 1953, 169. 
53Ibid. I 168. 
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over the past few months: 21 letters were received in 
November 1952; 18 in December 1952; 29 in January 1953; and 
72 in February 1953~. Radio Free Europe attributed the 
increase to the fact that Eisenhower had been elected 
President, that liberation was official United States 
policy, and that Radio Free Europe had been broadcasting all 
developments in Washington to the Polish people. 
On 5 March 1953, news of the death of Soviet leader 
Joseph Stalin reached Washington. The question was: how 
should the United States respond? Just the day before the 
National Security Council had discussed Stalin's illness, 
with c. D. Jackson saying that this presented the first big 
propaganda opportunity the United States had had in a long 
time. The President's response to this illness was very 
important psychologically and his reaction was to be more a 
psychological move than a diplomatic one.ss 
Jackson was shocked to find that "no Agency of this 
Government had in its files anything resembling a plan, or 
even a sense-making guidance" on how to react to Stalin's 
illness or death.s6 Eisenhower was similarly appalled at 
the lack of a plan and proclaimed in a cabinet meeting on 8 
~Radio Free Europe to Jackson, 12 March 1953, Box 5, 
Jackson Records. 
ss135th Meeting of the NSC, 4 March 1953, Box 4, NSC 
Series, Ann Whitman File. 
s6Jackson memo, 4 March 1953, Box 29, Administration 
Series, Ann Whitman File. 
March: "We have no plan. We are not even sure what differ-
ence this makes. 1157 A Newsweek article on 16 March summed 
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up the situation correctly: "The men in the White House were 
just as bewildered as the man on the street. They did not 
know how the death of Joseph Stalin would affect the future 
of the world. 1158 Radio Free Europe, on the other hand, ran 
a carefully planned program. Indeed, Radio Free Europe 
scooped all of the satellite countries' stations with the 
first broadcast of the news. It operated under the 
following presumptions: Stalin's death created a period of 
maximum tension in the satellite countries, so the station 
must take caution not to provoke premature and futile 
demonstrations of resistance; it showed no sympathy for 
Stalin but was not resorting to petty denunciations of him; 
and it attempted to sow doubt and confusion among satellite 
communists by emphasizing speculation on who would take over 
the government and what internal struggles might occur. 59 
All the while Radio Free Europe would assure the people that 
liberation would come. 
c. D. Jackson remarked that, "In the case of Radio Free 
Europe, because of their greater flexibility and freedom 
57Quoted in: Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold 
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 106. 
58 ncold war, Ike, and Malenkov: 'Watch and Wait' Is the 
Key," Newsweek, 16 March 1953, 34. 
59stalin's Death and Reactions and Results of the 
President's Speech, 30 March 1953, Box 892, Official File. 
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from official taboos, I was able to suggest a nasty idea or 
two."60 One such idea might have resulted in RFE's 
broadcast of a report entitled "Poles overcome by Stalin's 
Death," purportedly provided by a factory worker in 
swidnica, Poland: 
A liquor prohibition was enforced by the authorities 
here on the third day after the announcement of Stalin's 
illness, at the time when the illness was becoming 
critical. In the majority of places you could only get 
wea~ beer and only if you looked as if you really needed 
it. But most people had something stored away for such 
an occasion, and I, for one, thought it fitting and re-
spectful to drink to the health of the Great Thinker and 
wish him long life and recovery. But it was too late 
and our fervent toasts were of no avail, so instead we 
solemnized his all-too-early call to Valhalla. It was 
done with great decorum, as benefits such an occasion, 
at least among our people. Unfortunately there were 
many Poles whose grief was so great that the1r lost 
consciousness. 61 
Dulles conveyed the United States government's 
"official condolences" on 6 March 1953, but the White House 
and State Department were otherwise quiet. The Resolution 
on Captive Peoples was put aside at this time as no one 
wanted to antagonize the Soviets. Watchfulness was the 
policy for the moment, while a struggle for•power ensued in 
the Soviet Union. Georgi M. Malenkov, the new prime 
60Jackson memo, 4 March 1953, Box 29, Administration 
Series, Ann Whitman File. 
6111 Poles overcome By Stalin's Death," News From Behind 
the Iron Curtain, May 1953, 49. Additionally, the American 
Embassy in Warsaw noted that upon Stalin's death: "At no 
time did any Embassy officer see any visible sign of 
personal sorrow ••.. " United states Department of State, 
"Quarterly Report of Poland's Foreign and Domestic Develop-
ments," Confidential United States State Department Central 
Files, Poland, 1950-1954, 10 April 1953. 
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minister, appeared to be leading the race to succeed Stalin, 
but Nikita Khrushchev was advancing as well as he became the 
Party's new senior secretary. c. D. Jackson concluded that 
the soviet government appeared unified for the moment due to 
the initial shock of Stalin's death, so the President was to 
wait and make a major speech when an appropriate opportunity 
arose. Until then, the United States would stress world 
peace and hope that when the new Soviet leader appeared, he 
would respond to this hope for peace. The United States 
expected no change in the Soviet's economic and military 
power or in its tight control over the satellite 
countries.~ The Soviets would likely continue their 
hostility toward the West as they would fear the West's 
consolidation and a possible move against the bloc in this 
period of uncertainty.fil 
Meanwhile, Eisenhower set up task forces to study and 
make recommendations concerning three alternative strate-
gies under the heading of Project Solarium: containment 
(continuation of the Truman years); global deterrence 
~Proof of the continuing Soviet domination of Poland 
can be seen in a speech given by Bierut on 28 March 1953. 
In it, he devoted over 50 paragraphs to the adulation and 
deification of Stalin. The text appears in Confidential US 
Files. Poland, 1950-1954, 21 April 1953. 
filprobable Consequences of the Death of st~lin and the 
Elevation of Malenkov to Leadership in the USSR, 10 March 
1953, Box 1, Jackson Records. Also see the report of the 
same name and date in CIA Research Reports, The Soviet Union 
1946-1976 (Frederick, Md: University Publications of 
America, 1982). 
(increase American commitments and meet communist 
transgressions with severe punishment); and liberation.M 
When Eisenhower's task forces reported to him, liberation 
was chosen as the most desirable policy, to be achieved 
through political, psychological, economic, and even 
paramilitary warfare designed to penetrate the communist 
empire, "roll it back," and liberate the captive peoples. 65 
It is no surprise Eisenhower chose this strategy as it was 
consistent with what his administration had already been 
attempting in its first days in power. 
28 
Despite the lack of any overt policy changes or actions 
on the part of the soviet Union or of the United States, the 
propaganda war continued unabated. Voice of America 
broadcast the American view that, "whatever the impact of 
Stalin's death upon the Soviet ruling class and upon the 
Russian people, one thing is historically certain--the 
totalitarian system which is Stalin's legacy one day will 
fall from its own internal weakness."66 In the United 
MFor more on Project Solarium, see: Brands, " The Age 
of Vulnerability," American Historical Review, 963-89; David 
B. Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidencv and American 
Foreign Policy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 41; 
Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower 
Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 
(Summer 1990): 319-42; James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, 
United Sstates Foreign Policy and World Order, 2d ed. 
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1981), 176. 
65Nathan, United States Foreign Policy and World Order, 
176. 
6611Voice Forecasts Battle for Power," New York Times, 7 
March 1953, 3. 
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Nations, American Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., made a 
statement that it was obvious since the UN's founding that 
it alone cannot create peace as long as a major power leans 
the other way. Malenkov eventually responded by issuing a 
surprising statement that any and all "troublesome and 
unsolved questions may be resolved by peaceful negotia-
tions. "67 
This pronouncement created a stir and the United States 
responded that it was interested in Malenkov's words, but 
that words needed to be backed up with deeds such as 
resolving the deadlock in the UN over a world disarmament 
plan. The Soviets rejected the American proposal as 
artificial. As such unfruitful talk continued, the United 
States experienced a Soviet diplomatic attack through its 
Polish satellite. On 5 March, a Pole had flown a MiG-5 to 
Denmark, requesting asylum in that country. The Polish 
government demanded the return of both the pilot and the 
airplane and charged that United States authorities were 
organizing espionage, subversion, and sabotage within 
Poland's borders, calling these activities America's 
"Volcano Plan." According to this alleged plan, targets in 
Poland were to be chosen for bombing by American Air Force 
planes at some future date. A second confrontation occurred 
when the Polish Embassy in Washington, o.c. began 
67Harrison E. Salisbury, "Malenkov Offers To Settle 
Tensions by Peaceful Means," New York Times, 16 March 1953, 
1. 
,---
distributing a booklet entitled "Documents on the Hostile 
Policy of the United States Government Towards People's 
Poland." The Department of State requested that its 
distribution be stopped.~ 
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such problems with Poland, Malenkov•s peaceful words, 
the Soviet propaganda attack on the United States, and an 
article appearing in Pravda 18 March discussing "capitalist 
encirclement," caused the National Security Council to 
conclude at its meeting on 26 March that: " ••• [the] pattern 
of Soviet psychological tactics since Stalin's death appears 
to be aimed at using the 'new look' of Malenkov•s succession 
to advance with greater impact the traditional aims of 
Stalinism. "69 In other words, the NSC believed Soviet 
actions would continue to attempt to subvert the West while 
Malenkov publicly voiced words of peace and of problem-
solving. Malenkov, in the American view, was seeking a 
propaganda victory in the Cold War. 
On 16 April 1953, Eisenhower addressed the duality of 
Soviet words and actions in a speech he made concerninq the 
6811Poland Renews Anti-U. s. Charge," New York Times, 18 
March 1953, 4; "Poland Renews Anti-u.s. Charge," New York 
Times, 22 March 1953, 34; "Pole Flies to Denmark in First 
Intact Russian MiG-5 to Reach West," New York Times, 6 March 
1953, 1,3; "Polish Embassy Asked to Cease Distributing Anti-
u.s. Book," Department of State Bulletin, 20 April 1953, 
578; "U.S. Scores Poles' Book," New York Times, 31 March 
1953, 19. 
~Psychological Planning Board--Stalin's Death--Soviet 
Lures and Pressures Since, 26 March 1956, Box 1, Jack>on 
Records. 
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post-Stalin world. This speech was his "Chance For Peace" 
speech. It began: 
In this spring of 1953 the free world weighs one 
question above all others: the chance for a just peace 
for all peoples •••• The way chosen by the United states 
was plainly marked by a few clear precepts, which govern 
its conduct in world affairs: 
(1) No people on earth can be held, as a people, to 
be an enemy, for all humanity shares the common 
hunger for peace and fellowship and justice. 
(2) No nation's security and well-being can be 
achieved by isolation 
(3) Any nation's right to a form of government and 
an economic system of its own choosing is in-
alienable. 
(4) Any nation's attempt to dictate to other nations 
their form of government is indefensible." 
(5) Lasting peace cannot be based on an arms race 
but in just relations and honest understanding. 
The Soviet government held a vastly different vision 
of the future. Security was not found in mutual trust 
and aid, but in force. 
There remained, however, one thing essentially 
unchanged and unaffected by Soviet conduct: the readi-
ness of the free nations to welcome sincerely any gen-
uine evidence of peaceful purpose enabling all peoples 
again to resume their common quest of just peace ••• We 
welcome every honest act of peace •••• We care nothing for 
mere rhetoric .••. I know of nothing I can add to make 
plainer the sincere purpose of the United States ••• What 
is the Soviet Union ready to do? Whatever the answer be, 
let it be plainly spoken •••• Is prepared to allow 
other nations, including those of Eastern Europe, the 
free choice of their own forms of government?70 
The speech, eliciting no official reply from the Soviet 
Union, received an unofficial response to the American 
challenge in Pravda: 
Facts show that only by a stubborn struggle for their 
rights did the peoples of Eastern Europe come to the 
70Quoted in: Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin, eds., 
Speeches of the American Presidents (New York: H. W. Wilson 
Co., 1988), 569-72. 
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present popular-democratic form of government •••• It 
would be strange to expect the Soviet Union to interfere 
in favor of installing the reactionary reqimes over-
thrown by these peoples. 71 
With this one article, Pravda reduced Eisenhower's offer to 
work with the Soviet Union for a just peace in Europe to the 
level of mere propaganda as the offer was rejected by the 
Soviet Union. As expectations for a dialogue fell, inter-
national affairs between these two countries returned to 
business as usual. 
As no resolution of the problems existing between the 
United States and the Soviet Union appeared forthcoming, 
America looked to its allies and to possible psychol.ogical 
or propaganda victories it could gain, such as exploiting 
the results of the United States Escapee Program (created 21 
March 1952 within the State Department by President Truman 
and continued under Eisenhower). This program was designed 
to meet the needs of escapees from communist countries, such 
as providing toiletries upon their arrival in the West, 
determining their abilities and providing vocational and 
language training as needed, and resettling them. In March 
1953 alone, 58,000 refugees arrived in West Berlin. Due to 
these large numbers, the National Security Council decided 
to exploit the escapees for psychological value and from 
then on, United States policy encouraged the defection of 
all Soviet nationals and of "key" personnel from the 
71Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation, 127. 
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satellite countries. Phase "A" of this policy provided for 
the reception, care and resettlement of the people. Phase 
"B" concerned the subsequent "use" of the escapees, such as 
the exploitation of the facts of their escape by Radio Free 
Europe and by other similar organizations. On 22 April 
1953, Eisenhower asked Congress to pass legislation allowing 
120,000 immigrants a year for the next two years into the 
United States. This calculated move was designed to 
demonstrate that America was willing to look after people 
the Soviet system could not or would not support. The 
Escapee Program reflected negatively on the Soviets and on 
the puppet satellite regimes, while aiding such Western 
allies as the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain who had 
been struggling with the flood of refugees to their 
countries. Moreover, the refugees provided the United 
States with considerable intelligence about activities 
behind the Iron Curtain.n 
In another move, Dulles and Joseph Flack, the American 
ambassador to Poland, discussed on 4 May a plan to offer 
food to one or more satellites through the International Red 
Cross or some similar agency. This proposal held potential 
nFor more on the Escapee Program, see_Frank L. 
Querbach,_ "The Refugee Relief Act of 1953, 11 The Department 
of State Bulletin, 24 August 1953, 231-35; "President's 
Proposal for Admission of European Migrants, The Department 
of State Bulletin, 15 June 1953, 857-59; Psychological Value 
of Escapees from the Soviet Orbit, 30 March 1953, Box 1, 
Jackson Records; United States Escapee Program, 21 March 
1952, Robert K. Gray Records. 
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propaganda value whether accepted by the satellite regimes 
or not. Dulles requested Flack's view on the issue and 
wanted to know if any food shortages existed in Poland. 
Flack responded that a few shortages of some items existed, 
but that there was no threat to the health of the 
population. As to the offer of food, Flack felt that the 
Polish government would "violently reject (the) offer"73 
which implied it was unable to support its people. The 
regime would use the offer for its own propagandistic 
purposes, e.g., accuse the United States of dumping low-
grade commodities on the countries of Eastern Europe. 
Meanwhile, a press release by Dulles on 3 May, the 162nd 
anniversary of the first Polish Constitution,~ noted that 
that document had been written "during another period of 
great national trial [when) the people of Poland proclaimed 
with a voice that no tyranny has ever been able to silence--
their will to be free. 1175 
Although the Poles remained quiet on this anniversary, 
a month later the Czechs and East Germans made considerable 
7311Ambassador in Poland (Flack) to the Department of 
State," Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 8, 
Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1988), 58. 
~The Polish Constitution, signed 3 May 1791, was ~he 
second democratic constitution after that of the United 
States. Unfortunately, the 1791 constitution was short-
lived, as Poland was soon partitioned and did not regain its 
independence again until after World War I. 
75Charles E. Egan, "American Leaders Hail Spirit of 
Poles," New York Times, 3 May 1953, 1. 
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noise. on 1 June, workers at the Skoda factory in Pilsen, 
Czechoslovakia, rioted, seizing city hall and attacking 
symbols of communist authority. The riot, quickly 
suppressed, received little attention in America because it 
was so short-lived and localized. The East German riots, on 
the other hand, proved a test for Eisenhower's liberation 
policy. 
East Germans had been experiencing economic diff icul-
ties, such as labor shortages, longer working hours for 
lower wages, and general communist inefficiency, which had 
led to food shortages in the country. On 16 June, two weeks 
after the Pilsen uprising, East German workers marched to 
the House of Ministries carrying a sign stating, "We demand 
a reduction in the norms. "76 By the time the workers 
reached the ministries building, a crowd consisting of other 
workers, students, and non-workers had already gathered 
calling for secret ballots and the resignation of the 
Communist government. The demonstration, originally about 
economic grievances, quickly became one for ~eform, 
democracy, and freedom. The following day the police and 
the Soviet army arrived as the revolt became more violent 
and the people more vocal in their anti-communist, anti-
Soviet demands. By nightfall, however, all was quiet and 
martial law had been instituted. The communists remained 
76Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation, 131. 
firmly in control and the West feared that the local 
population would probably suffer from reprisals.n 
The immediate American response was silence; as with 
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the death of Stalin, no contingency plan existed for such an 
event. At the 150th meeting of the NSC on 18 June, the 
members noted that Molotov's "soft" policies were affecting 
the satellites, as witnessed by the Czech and East German 
riots. The NSC believed that for the first time the slaves 
of the Soviet Union felt "they could do something" and they 
showed the world that they were willing to die for freedom. 
The meeting concluded with a consensus that if the Soviets 
had to rely on their own troops to put the riot down--as the 
local troops were not trustworthy--then this was a sign of 
promise. Beyond this analysis, they proffered no plan at 
the meeting. Indeed, it was not until a week later that 
some guidelines were formed. The NSC decided to recommend 
passive resistance to the people of East Germany and Eastern 
Europe in order to avoid bloodshed and that the United 
States should continue the use of the rioting East Germans' 
slogan of free elections. 78 
nFor more information on the East German riots: Arnulf 
Baring, The Uprising in East Germany: June 17. 1953 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1972); Martin McCauley, The German 
Democratic Republic Since 1945 (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1983); Jonathan Steele, Inside East Germany, The 
State That Came In From the Cold (New York: Urizen Books, 
1977). 
78150th Meeting of the NSC, 18 June 1953, Box 4, NSC 
Series, Ann Whitman File; U.S. Policies and Actions to 
Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States, 25 June 1953, 
The failure of the United States to liberate East 
Germany or even to act in such a way as to gain them more 
freedom was perceived by liberation critics as the failure 
of the policy of liberation.n The positive policy of 
action that the American people had counted on when 
Eisenhower took off ice was unveiled as a policy of mere 
rhetoric. It appeared that the old policy of containment 
was still in place. Neither the East Germans, nor the 
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Poles, nor any other satellite peoples would be free. The 
great hope for the future was dashed by America's inability 
to act in East Germany. So it appeared to many in the 
world, but was this really the end of efforts to repace 
.containment with a policy of liberation? No one in the 
administration believed so. 
Box 4, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File. 
79For more on critics of liberation, see preface. See 
also Charles c. Alexander, Holding the Line: The Eisenhower 
Era 1953-1961 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975). 
on page 64, he writes: "Yet as Kennan commented, from the 
outset Dulles 'knew very well that whatever he might say 
publically, he was going to have to pursue in reality ••• 
pretty much the policy (of containment] toward the Soviet 
Union with which my name had often been connected.'" 
Reichard quoted Ambrose: "'Eisenhower and Dulles continued 
the policy of containment• and •avoided any embarassment 
over their lack of action through their rhetoric.'" 
Reichard, South Atlantic Quarterly, 278. 
II. A STRATEGY IS FORMED 
On 29 June 1953, in the immediate wake of the East 
German riots, the Jackson Committee presented its report on 
international information activities to Eisenhower, 
concluding that there appeared no evidence of any basic 
change in the perceived Soviet objective of world 
domination. Although the Jackson Committee felt the key to 
Soviet strength lay in its tightly organized political 
system and impressive political warfare capabilities, the 
weaknesses of the Soviet system were the attitudes of the 
Soviet and satellite peoples towards their rulers. Finally, 
the report concluded that political warfare should be used 
as an instrument of national policy for applying pressure to 
Eastern Europe by offering hope, preventing sovietization, 
and providing objective and reliable news to these 
countries. 
The committee further noted that the primary purpose of 
an information program was to persuade foreign nationals 
that it was in their best interest to take actions 
consistent with the national objectives of the United 
38 
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States. It also advised that greater effort be used to 
enlist private American organizations to advance American 
objectives and the United States aim to improve internation-
al cooperation on propaganda in international organizations 
and with allied governments. Radio programs such as those 
produced by Voice of America and Radio Free Europe were to 
continue; the number of exchanges of persons should 
increase; publications, films, information centers and 
especially inexpensive books needed to be made more widely 
available as well. 80 
Robert L. Johnson, chief administrator of the 
International Information and Educational Exchange Program, 
summed up the Jacksc. .• Committee's conclusions: 
"The ••• purposes of the information program should be to 
submit evidence to the peoples of other nations that their 
own aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace are 
supported and advanced by the objectives and policies of the 
United States. 1181 To accomplish this, the committee 
recommended the establishment of the Operations Coordination 
Board within the NSC to coordinate NSC policies among all 
bureaus and agencies to ensure that they carried out the 
plans correctly, and the establishment of the United States 
80Jackson Committee Report, 29 June 1953, Box 4, NSC 
Series, Ann Whitman File. 
81U.S. International Information Administration, 29 July 
1953, Box 13, Administration Series, Ann Whitman File. 
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Information Agency to coordinate American propaganda abroad 
with United States policies and objectives. 
The East German revolt demonstrated to Eisenhower that 
concrete policies and strategies to achieve liberation were 
virtually nonexistent. Consequently, the National Security 
Council finally cobbled together an interim plan on 29 June 
entitled "United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit 
the Unrest in the Satellite States." NSC 158 called for the 
United States government to pursue certain psychological 
objectives: 
{l) To nourish resistance to communist aggression 
throughout satellite Europe, short of mass rebellion 
in areas under Soviet military control, and without 
compromising its spontaneous nature. 
{2) To undermine satellite puppet authority. 
(3) To exploit satellite unrest as demonstrable proof 
that the Soviet empire is beginning to crumble. 
{4) To convince the free world, particularly Western 
Europe, that love of liberty and hatred of alien 
oppression are stronger behind the Iron curtain than 
it has been dared to believe and that resistance to 
totalitarianism is less hopeless than has been 
imagined. 
The objectives aimed to undermine the authority of the 
satellite governments through the implementation of a dual 
phase plan. The first phase required under sixty days to 
initiate: 
{i) Reemphasize United States support for German unity 
based on free elections followed by a peace treaty 
(2) Implement Volunteer Freedom Corps completing dis-
cussions as soon as possible with Allied governments 
{3) Consider bringing soviet repression of the East 
German revolt before the UN 
The second, or long-term, phase needed more lengthly 
preparation: 
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(1) Consider United States advocacy of 
-Free elections in the satellites and association 
with the West European community, with emphasis on 
economic cooperation and rehabilitation, and 
-Subsequent withdrawal of all foreign troops from 
Germany, Austria, and the satellites 
(2) Cultural appeals to Soviet intellectuals 
(3) Consider the inclusion of Soviet nationals in Phase 
II of the Volunteer Freedom corps project 82 
NSC 158, roughly an outline of a strategy to guide the 
administration in the formulation of later plans, suggested 
psychological warfare, rhetoric, humanitarian aid, and 
covert operations be used to combat Soviet power and to 
hopefully bring a measure of freedom to the satellites. 
Although plans would change and develop over the next three 
years, the means to achieve their ends would remain the same 
as those suggested in NSC 158--largely propaganda. 
Concerning the short-term recommendations of NSC 158, 
the "Resolution on the Situation in Germany" passed by 
Congress on 2 July fulfilled the first suggestion. The 
second proposal aimed to incorporate escapees from the Iron 
curtain countries into the United States military; however, 
there were too many details to work out for the VFC to be 
realized. As to the last and similarly unsuccessful 
proposal, Eisenhower thought it unwise to condemn the 
Soviets in the UN for their actions in East Germany. Such a 
82United states Objectives and Actions to Exploit the 
unrest in the Satellite States, 29 June 1953, Box 1, Office 
of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. 
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charge would turn the UN into a mere forum for propaganda, 
and he did not want to open the United States up for later 
reprisals by the Soviet Union in the General Assembly. The 
long-term actions were never accomplished. 
NSC 158 was not a plan for liberation or for a rollback 
of Soviet power. It was an outline of steps the 
administration could take to weaken the prestige of the 
Soviet empire without jeopardizing the outbreak of war. As 
yet, no liberation plan existed, but it was clear the tools 
of such a plan would be psychological warfare, rhetoric, 
humanitarian aid, and covert operations. Eisenhower and 
Dulles drew certain conclusions about EasteLn Europe: 
{l) There is exploitation of the working class by the 
East German government that professes to protect it 
{2) Soviet satellite regimes do not have real popular 
support 
{3) The satellite governments are Soviet puppets 
{4) Puppet regimes can be challenged by a population 
{5) The riots were ostensibly against the harsh con-
ditions, but they were really for freedom and 
against Soviet domination 
Therefore, United States objectives should be: 
{l) 
{2) 
{3) 
{4) 
Show people in satellite countries through facts, 
reports and interpretations that are credible and 
convincing that Soviet power was not impregnable 
and that East German resistance was a success 
Strengthen the confidence in the potential of their 
own strength and increase their spirit of resis-
tance 
Make Soviet control of satellite people as diffi-
cult as possible without risking bloodshed and 
risking our reliable reputation 
Reflect United States opposition to their enslave-
ment and United states determination that liberty be 
restored to these people 
(5) Maintain level of resistance calculated to exploit 
any opportunities that appear83 
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After the riots in East Germany, Radio Free Europe and 
the Eisenhower administration appeared more determined in 
their propaganda efforts than before. An example of a 
broadcast to Poland by Radio Free Europe ran along the lines 
of describing the qualities of the type of man that the 
totalitarian regime was trying to produce. That man did not 
want freedom, was a tool of the state, a robot without any 
human feelings, and was essentially a dehumanized indivi-
dual. Taught to hate, he hated the enemy and struggled 
against this enemy to unmask and destroy him. Unfortunate-
ly, Soviet morality had its own concept of virtue and crime, 
crime being associated with the struggle for freedom or 
faith in God. Fortunately, the West was mobilizing its 
positive strength to build a lasting peace on the principle 
of independence of all nations; therefore, when one thinks 
of liberation, think in terms of when and not if •84 
In a White House press release on 7 August, Eisenhower 
hailed the signing of the Refugee Relief Act that would 
allow 214,000 immigrants into the United states, 186,000 of 
whom would be escapees from communist countries. Eisenhower 
felt that the passage of this act demonstrated America's 
83
"Unrest in Satellite Countries," FRUS, vol. 2, 
National Security Affairs, 1728-29. 
8411 This is Radio Free Europe," News From Behind the Iron 
Curtain, June 1953, 41. 
concern for homeless, persecuted, and less fortunate 
individuals in other lands and was in dramatic contrast to 
what was occurring in Eastern Europe. 85 The defection of 
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Dr. Marek Stanislaw Korowicz, first alternate member of the 
Polish delegation to the UN, provided another propaganda 
victory for the West. Korowicz announced that 95 percent of 
the Poles were opposed to their communist leaders and that 
people felt Soviet power in their country could be "disrup-
ted from within." Saying that it was important to get the 
true news into Poland and commending Radio Free Europe, he 
later broadcast to Poland over that station words that the 
United states used for propaganda purposes. 86 
In October the United States tried a different tactic, 
the use of humanitarian efforts to try to ease some of the 
tension between the two governments. Dulles notified 
Ambassador Flack that the United States proposed a Christmas 
season gift package operation in Poland in which CARE would 
mail packages containing food to Polish recipients 
designated by their friends and family in th~ United States. 
Despite expectations to the contrary, the Polish government 
approved this operation and packages were distributed at 
85
"Refugee Relief Act Signed," Department of State 
Bulletin, 17 August 1953, 1-2. 
86John c. Devlin, "New Polish Alternate at UN Asks 
Asylum Here," New York Times, 19 September 1953, 1. 
Christmas. The United States had succeeded in gaining 
contact with the Polish people. 87 
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However, this one bright spot was not indicative of the 
general relations between the two countries. The American 
propaganda campaign made the Polish regime uncomfortable, 
which in turn led to a governmental crackdown on the Polish 
church. It was estimated that upwards of 95 percent of the 
population supported the Catholic church in Poland either 
due to their own beliefs or in an effort to oppose the 
regime as it was the only truly nationalist and non-
communist organization in the country. 88 The state struck 
against this enemy on 25 September and arrested Cardinal 
Stefan Wyszynski, the Polish Primate and a true leader of 
the Polish nation. The Eisenhower administration used this 
87The American Embassy in Vienna sent its opinion of the 
Polish people's response to the packages to the Department 
of state: "They have a fantastic belief that the USA can 
never be vanquished ••• The packages sent by them to Europe 
have done a magnificent job of propaganda for the US." 
Confidential us Files, Poland, 1950-1954, 19 October 1953, 
5. 
88For more on the Catholic Church in Poland and Cardinal 
Wys~ynski, see: "Arrest of Cardinal Wyszynski," Department 
of State Bulletin 19 October 1953, 528-29; "Quarterly Report 
of Poland's Principal Foreign and Domestic Developments, 
July-September 1953," Confidential United States State 
Department Central Files. Poland (Frederick, Md: University 
Publications of America, n.d.); Bogdan Szajdowski, Next to 
God-Poland: Politics and Religion in Contemporary Poland 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); Stefan Wyszynski, A 
Freedom Within: The Prison Notes of Stefan Cardinal 
Wyszynski, trans. by Barbara Krzywicki-Herburt and Walter J. 
Ziemba (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983); Norbert 
A. Zmijewski, The Catholic-Marxist Ideological Dialogue in 
Poland, 1945-1980 (Brookfield, Vt: Dartmouth, 1991). 
unjust arrest for propaganda against the communists as it 
demonstrated their penchant for force and disrespect for 
human rights. 
Tensions mounted again between the two governments 
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when, in December, the public learned that Lt. Colonel Jozef 
Swiatlo of the Polish political police, and Deputy Chief of 
Department 10 (where all the compromising information on 
others was kept) of the Ministry of Public Security had 
sought asylum in the West. No details were released but the 
West was already questioning Swiatlo on the situation in 
Poland. Relations appeared destined not to improve. 
Fortunately, by the end of the year the United states 
finally had an official policy towards the satellite 
regimes. NSC 174, established 11 December 1953, was a 
statement on "United States Policy Toward Soviet Satellites 
in Eastern Europe" and was the first plan to outline 
concrete steps that could be taken to bring the long-term 
goal of liberation closer; thus, an issue that the world 
thought dead was alive to the Eisenhower ad~inistration. 
NSC 174 noted the following: 
(1) The soviets controlled and exploited the satellites 
despite problems 
(2) Barriers to consolidation of the Soviet Union were: 
-The anti-communist attitude of the great majority 
of the population in each satellite. This anti-
communism is intensified particularly by loss of 
personal freedom and a reduced standard of living, 
as well as by outraged religious and national 
feelings, but its undiminished survival over the 
long run is jeopardized by communist control over 
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every aspect of the lives of the people, particu-
larly the young. 
-The continued refusal of the West to accept the 
permanence of the imposed satellite regimes as 
compatible with the freedom and self-determination 
of nations; 
(3) Underground groups were scattered 
(4) A Tito-like regime was not expected to appear in 
other satellites even though Tito showed proof that 
there was an alternative to the Kremlin 
(5) The detachment of any major European satellite from 
the Soviet bloc does not now appear feasible except 
by Soviet acquiescence or by war89 
The NSC 174 policy conclusion was that the policy 
sought resistance to domination over the satellites~ and 
elimination of that influence. 
Accordingly, feasible political, economic, propa-
ganda and co~ert measures are required to create and 
exploit troublesome problems for the Soviet Union, com-
plicate control in the satellites and retard the growth 
of the military and economic potential of the Soviet 
bloc. Decisions on such measures to impose pressures on 
the Soviet bloc should take into account the desira-
bility of creating conditions which will induce the 
Soviet leadership to be more receptive to acceptable 
negotiated settlements. Accordingly, this policy should 
be carried out by flexible courses of action in the 
light of current estimates of the Soviet Government's 
reactions and of the situation in the satellite states 
concerned, after calculation of the advantages and 
disadvantages to the general position of the United 
States in relation to the Soviet Union and to the free 
world. 
NSC 174 objectives were: 
Long-range: The eventual fulfillment of the rights 
of the peoples in the Soviet satellites to enjoy govern-
ments of their own choosing, free of Soviet domination 
89u. s. Policy Toward Soviet Satellites in Eastern 
Europe, 11 December 1953, Box 8, NSC Series, Office of the 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. 
~author's emphasis. 
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and participating as peaceful members in the free world 
community. 
Current: To disrupt the Soviet-satellite relation-
ship, minimize satellite contributions to Soviet power, 
and deter aggressive world policies on the part of the 
Soviet Union by diverting Soviet attention and energies 
to problems and difficulties within the Soviet bloc. 
Courses of action therefore included: continued negotiations 
with the Soviet Union and involvement in the UN and NATO; 
increasing resistance and hope in the satellites without 
inciting them to premature revolt or commitments on American 
action to bring liberation; promoting passive resistance; 
promoting nationalist, religious, cultural, and social 
sentiments; aiding defectors and refugee organizations; 
increasing unity in the West; continued diplomatic missions 
to the Eastern European countries; promoting anti-communist 
elements and disaffection in the armed services; stimulating 
conflict within the bloc and between it and the Soviet 
Union; and continued advocacy of the right of peoples to 
choose their own government. 91 
In sum, the United states could take direct action for 
liberation--but that would lead to a global war; accept the 
fact of Soviet control--an unacceptable option; or call for 
the eventual elimination of Soviet power, but not give a 
time period for this decline. The administration chose the 
third choice by f ollo~ing the courses of action mentioned 
above. The methods to be used included diplomacy, 
91u.s. Policy Towards Soviet Satellites in Eastern 
Europe, 11 December 1953, Box 8, NSC Series, Office of the 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. 
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propaganda, economic policy and covert operations to 
maintain the morale of anti...;soviet elements, sow confusion, 
discredit the authority of the regimes, disrupt relations 
with the Soviet Union, and generally to maximize Soviet 
difficulties. 
As these were all flexible and adaptable courses of 
action, NSC 174 remained a valid policy despite the world 
situation at any given time. The importance of this plan 
was that it recognized liberation as a long-term goal and 
proved that it had not been abandoned after the East German 
riots as many had assumed. NSC 174 showed the administra-
tion's aim was to slow down and/or prevent the sovietization 
process in the satellite countries. If the peoples could 
not be sovietized, the communists were prevented from 
consolidating their power and thus from using this added 
strength to act against the West. This also meant that the 
satellite peoples were ensuring their future liberation by 
resisting their absorption into the Soviet Union. As Dulles 
had stated on 27 January 1953: "The Russian 'Communists, as 
I've pointed out, have swallowed a great many people to 
date, approximately 800 million, but you know there is such 
a thing as indigestion." 92 What could not be absorbed would 
eventually have to be rejected. 
92Quoted in: "A Survey of Foreign Policy Problems, 
Address by Secretary Dulles," The Department of State 
Bulletin, 9 February 1953, 215. 
50 
Eisenhower, although elected because of his popularity 
and on the hope of liberation, never held it as a short-term 
goal. Since he wanted to avoid a war with the Soviets, he 
had to rely on liberation through peaceful means, something 
only possible in the long-term. What Eisenhower needs to be 
recognized as accomplishing was not a return to containment 
but the creation of NSC 174. This call to action establish-
ed the policy of resisting Soviet domination of the 
satellites and maximizing its difficulties in the eastern 
bloc. He pointed the United States towards liberation and 
outlined the increments by which this goal could be 
achieved. Only by looking at NSC 174 is it clear what the 
Eisenhower administration hoped to attain. As was mentioned 
in the preface, for Eisenhower to take advantage of 
opportunities, he had to keep these opportunities secret, 
thus the rhetorical smoke-screen. 
III. THE NEXT TWO YEARS, 1954-1955 
To achieve the disruption in soviet-satellite relations 
envisioned by the NSC, Eisenhower needed to be sure that he 
had the support of other countries as well. On 7 January 
1954, he stated: "American freedom is interlocked with the 
freedom of other peoples. 1193 However, he particularly 
worried that the countries of Western Europe might be 
seduced by the Soviet's "new look" strategy, a policy in 
which the Soviets appeared to desire peace, better relations 
with the West, and a cessation of past tensions. Eisenhower 
and Dulles felt this "look" was merely a change of tactics 
rather than a change of objectives on the part of the Soviet 
Union. 
c. D. Jackson in particular was not fooled by the new 
Soviet tactic. In a letter to the president on 24 February 
he related what this "new look" really meant after meeting 
with Soviet representatives in Berlin. 
During the social gatherings, whether in the Soviet 
Embassy or when we were hosts, the Soviet mood was one 
of great personal friendliness, sometimes verging on an 
93Israel, State of the Union Messages, 3v27. 
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almost pathetic eagerness to be liked personally even 
though professionally the gap between us was as great as 
ever.~ 
The Polish Government-in-Exile in London~ was not fooled 
either and made the following evaluation and suggestions 
through its representative, Mr. Adam Ciolkosz, Foreign 
Secretary, Polish Political Council in London, to the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. He stated that the communist 
regime in Poland was weak and confused now that Stalin was 
dead, whereas before, the regime had always received 
specific orders from Moscow; now the orders were either 
vague or non-existent. For example, the 2nd Congress of the 
Polish Communist Party had been due to meet, but as no 
orders had arrived from Moscow instructing it to meet, the 
Congress was postponed.% 
Ciolkosz proclaimed Radio Free Europe to be extremely 
effective and remarked that President Eisenhower had made a 
great impression on Poland and on all the countries behind 
the Iron curtain as for the first time someone in a 
~Post-Berlin Thoughts on the Current Soviet Psyche, 24 
February 1954, Box 41, Jackson Papers. 
~The Polish Government-in-Exile was one of three groups 
of Polish exiles, divided by differences. It proposed to 
offer an alternative to the communist government in People's 
Poland, but was not recognized by the United states or by 
most other governments. 
%United States House, Hearings Before the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Polish Government-in-Exile in London: Views 
on German Rearmament and Communist Control of Eastern 
Europe, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 589. 
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responsible position mentioned the liberation of Eastern 
European countries as a condition of stable peace in Europe 
and cooperation among nations based on confidence. The 
Polish people, however, were not happy that the issue of 
German reunification seemed to be in the foreground of 
American-Soviet relations. As the American and Soviet plans 
on German reunification were irreconcilable, the division of 
Europe would be maintained. What Ciolkosz and his 
organization recommended as a way to liberate Poland was for 
America to propose a unified but disarmed Germany to the 
Soviets. He reasoned that if the Soviets could have a 
disarmed Germany, they would withdraw from Eastern Europe as 
that would be preferable to staying in countries where they 
were unwelcome. In addition, all of Eastern Europe would 
welcome a unified and disarmed Germany because these 
countries still feared the possibility of another German 
invasion; thus, with one proposal, all the world would be 
behind the United States. Congress, however, ignored his 
testimony.~ 
The administration was further frustrated in its desire 
for better relatons with Poland when the Polish Consulates 
in New York, Chicago, and Detroit began circulating 
communist propaganda. The Department of State responded by 
closing the consulates, contending that they "serve no 
useful purpose in the conduct of relations between the 
~Ibid. 
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United States and Poland at the present time. 1198 Poland 
called this a "highly unfriendly step" and retaliated by 
asking the United States to close its consulate in Gdansk.~ 
These closures merely added fuel to the ongoing 
propaganda war. Radio Free Europe, utilizing the guidelines 
created by NSC 174, provided a way for the government to 
demonstrate its continued commitment to Polish freedom. RFE 
tried to convince the satellite people to use their own 
strength and ingenuity to hack at the Iron curtain from the 
inside, especially as they were strong now at a time when 
their rulers were confused and disorganized. It also 
directed a campaign against the police and the army in the 
hopes of undermining their loyalty to the communist leaders. 
The broadcasts also attempted to sow doubt among the 
communist officials by reminding them that any chances of 
living to a ripe old age were not great as most of them 
would either be disgraced, purged, imprisoned, or shot. The 
youths in the satellite countries were targeted as well and 
told to learn as much as they could about arms and 
soldiering because one day these skills would be needed. 100 
~"Poles' Consulates Ordered to Close," New York Times, 
26 February 1954, 1. Also in "Closing of Polish Consulates 
General," Department of State Bulletin 8 March 1954, 352. 
For the American Embassy's evaluation of the situation, see: 
"Quarterly Report of Poland's Principal Foreign and Domestic 
Developments," Confidential US Files, Poland. 1950-1954, 9 
April 1954. 
~Ibid. 
1lX1Iolt, strategic Psychological Operations, 210-11. 
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Dulles wrote Henry Ford on 25 March: "I say with confidence 
that Radio Free Europe is today one of the most effective 
means available to the Western World in combating Communist 
aggression .•• , 11101 meaning that by hindering sovietization 
of the satellites, the consolidation of Soviet power would 
not occur and such power could not then be used against the 
free world. 
on the 163rd anniversary of the Polish Constitution of 
1791, the United States hailed the document as an example of 
the Poles' tradition of freedom, and on 7 May the President 
wrote a letter to General Wladyslaw Anders of the Polish 
Armed Forces-in-Exile on the commemoration of the Battle of 
Monte Cassino. Eisenhower wrote that Monte Cassino was 
representative of the heroism and sacrifices of the Polish 
soldiers in the past war against the forces of totalitarian-
ism in Europe. The battle would stand as a symbol of the 
Polish nation's inextinguishable love of freedom. The 
Polish people today again were faced with foreign oppression 
and were meeting it with the same qualities of heroism. 
America was convinced their courage and faith in freedom 
were not in vain. 102 
On 15 July the first progress report on NSC 174 noted 
that in executing the policy the following actions had been 
101Dulles to Henry Ford, 25 March 1954, Box 7, 
Chronological Series, Dulles Papers. 
102united States Presidents. Public Papers. 1954, 482. 
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taken: the United States had continued its opposition to 
Soviet domination of the satellites; a one-megawatt 
transmitter had been put up in Germany in order to increase 
broadcasts to the Iron curtain; NATO had conferred on ways 
to coordinate propaganda broadcasts to the Soviet Union and 
satellites; the Escapee Program was expanded; West Berlin 
had become a showcase for the goods and policies of the 
West; messages and statements on occasions of national days 
in the East European countries were issued; and the Voice of 
America was keeping up its broadcast hours. 100 
In evaluating NSC 174, the report said: "Thus, while 
the policy objectives of NSC 174 remain valid as long-term 
goals, the ability OL the Unite~ States to take direct 
action towards achieving those objectives is limited."104 
The problem was that the United States wanted a rollback of 
Soviet power without risking war, the avoidance of which was 
another major American policy. This report shows that 
liberation was alive as a long-term policy1M and that the 
United States would never risk war for the satellites; 
however, it did not keep the United States from acting under 
the authority of NSC 174, to deter the sovietization of 
these peoples--a short-term objective. The report stated 
100Progress Report on NSC 174-Actions in Execution of 
Policy, 15 July 1954, Box 8, NSC Series, Office of the 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. 
104Ibid. 
1~Refer to page 51 for long-term objectives. 
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that all recommended actions were being carried out and 
provided a new list of actions to be carried out by December 
1954. This list stated specific actions the United States 
could do to decrease Soviet prestige in the eyes of the 
world and of the satellite peoples. For example, the United 
states was to press for the return of American citizens in 
Soviet jails, distribute films on the techniques of 
communist takeover and control, place a spotlight on the 
policies and problems of agriculture in the Soviet Union and 
the satellite countries, continue publication of Problems of 
Communism, issue statements on national holidays, display 
United States military strength whenever appropriate, see if 
it would be possible to develop cultural and technical 
exchanges, and continue advocacy of the right of peoples to 
their own independent governments. 1~ 
In keeping with the spirit of NSC 174, the Kapus 
family, Hungarian nationals and the first to receive visas 
under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, met with the 
President. As Dorothy D. Houghton, from the Office of 
Assistant Director for Refugees, Migration and Voluntary 
1~List of Agreed Courses of Action for Period 7/1/54 -
12/31/54 to Implement NSC 174, 25 August 1954, Box 67, OCB 
central File Series, Office of the Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs. In September 1954, the Assembly 
of captive European Nations was created. Following the 
spirit of NSC 174, it was an organization that became 
important for the Poles in exile as they organized to 
provide Washington with information about the situation in 
the Soviet bloc, stress the illegitimacy of the communist 
regimes, call for free elections under guidance of the UN, 
and warn against certain Soviet overtures to the West. 
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Assistance wrote to James c. Hagerty, Press Secretary at the 
White House, 
The dramatic circumstances of the Kapus escape from 
Hungary one year ago, the personal tragedy suffered by 
Mrs. Kapus (she lost her foot when she stepped on a 
mine) in crossing the border into Austria, and the fact 
that they are the first escapees to enter the United 
States under the Refugee Relief Act makes the case 
particularly valuable from the point of view of 
exploiting behind the Iron curtain the escapee program 
and as provided for by appropriate National Security 
Council directives. 100 
Another story exploited on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain was that of Jozef Swiatlo, who had defected to the 
West in December 1953, and was just beginning to tell his 
story over Radio Free Europe a year later. Radio Free 
Europe devoted over 150 programs to his tales of the many 
evils done by the Polish Communist party, the state, and by 
the Government. Poland, he said, was run exclusively by 
Moscow, especially through its ambassador to Poland, and 
Boleslaw Beirut, the leader of Poland, was a mere puppet who 
lived grandly while the workers were robbed of basic human 
rights while many even starved. He then detailed the 
activities of the Bezpieka, or the secret police. He told 
how they rigged elections, rewrote and reorganized history, 
imprisoned and murdered many Poles, and were essentially the 
spearhead of Soviet aggression in Poland. 
swiatlo's story was so widely publicized and detailed 
so many horrors that the Polish Government eventually 
100Houghton Memo to Hagerty, 2 August 1954, Box 578, 
Official Files, Office of the Staff Secretary. 
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dissolved their Ministry of Security. Radio Free Europe, 
pronouncing victory, claimed the closure occurred as a 
direct result of their heavy attack on the police-state 
aspect of communism. RFE felt that this event, as no other, 
demonstrated that propaganda could bring direct results in 
the war against the sovietization of a subject people. The 
Polish Communists did dissolve the Ministry, but the real 
reason was that the ruling elite had discovered the threat 
the secret police posed not just to the populace, but to 
them as well. It was an act committed out of self-
preservation rather than of embarassment over propaganda. 
Interestingly, the ruling elite had to learu about the 
Ministry of Security's threat to them through RFE. 1~ 
The new year brought new, more aggressive thinking into 
the Eisenhower administration. The Operations Coordinating 
Board, the small group within the NSC, produced a report on 
5 January 1955 entitled, "Analysis of the Situation with 
Respect to Possible Detachment of A Major European soviet 
Satellite." The OCB, assessing the possibility of detaching 
1~For more information on RFE and the swiatlo story, 
see Marcin Krol, "Listening Through the Jamming," American 
Scholar 61, no. 3 (1992): 431-35; Konrad Syrop, Spring in 
October; The Story of the Polish Revolution. 1956, 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1957), 21-24; "The Swiatlo 
Story," News From Behind The Iron curtain, March 1955, 3-36; 
Foreign Service Despatch from Vienna to the Department of 
state, February 18, 1955 and the Quarterly Report of 
Poland's Principal Foreign and Domestic Developments 
October-December 1954 in Records of the Department of State 
Relating to the Internal Affairs of Poland 1955-1959 
{Scholarly Resources, Inc., n.d.). 
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a satellite from the bloc by implementing NSC 174, realized 
this was an unlikely proposition as the United States did 
not want to risk war, but it examined the situation anyway. 
Internal action by a country was seen as the most possible 
means of detaching a satellite, whereas external action was 
ruled out as it was sure to lead to war. Covert operations 
supporting resistance were deemed risky as well as they 
would have to be on such a large scale and spread over so 
many years that the soviets would probably deem it the 
equivalent of open hostilities. The only other method of 
satellite detachment would be if the United States was 
victorious in a war against the Soviet Union; thus, the 
chances of the United States achieving detachment were 
limited as the Soviet Union held the trump card of actual 
possession of the countries, and detachment due to internal 
forces required a strong local leader and Eastern Europe 
peoples held most of their leaders in contempt. 
By the end of the month, the NSC had turned the OCB 
study into NSC 5505/l: "Exploitation of Sov~et and European 
Satellite Vulnerabilities." Using its guidelines, the 
United States increased pressures on the governments within 
the satellites. The policy aimed to discredit communist 
regimes and to again, hinder the Soviet Union in its effort 
to consolidate its power in the area, and to somewhat 
empower the satellite peoples. NSC 5501/l stated that one 
method to achieve this goal was to increase both popular and 
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bureaucratic pressures on the governments, thus causing them 
to spend more of their time on internal problems; in turn, 
this would increase tensions, divisions and infighting among 
the regimes. In order to accomplish this, propaganda was 
used to illustrate the following: the problems that existed 
with police states; low standards of living; opposition to 
collectivization; cultural and intellectual regimentation; 
interference with religion; dissatisfaction of the 
minorities; nationality problems; ideological weakness of 
the system and the government structure of the Soviet Union. 
Radio Free Europe, simultaneously making similar obser-
vations, found three forces working for the liberation of 
the satellites: external forces, such as the unity and 
strength of the West to resist the Soviet Union; orbital 
forces, such as the strain between the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia; and internal forces that were resisting a 
communist takeover. RFE still held to its principle of 
discouraging bloodshed by trying to maintain and enhance 
nonviolent resistance to the Soviets. The station's 
operating principles were to present the objective truth, to 
be a "home service" radio--providing news and entertainment 
that Radio Warsaw would provide if it were free--to remain 
autonomous, and to be a "tactical" operation by being fresh 
and timely and by frequently beating the communist radio 
stations to the news. Through these operating principles 
the NSC hoped to use Radio Free Europe to put NSC 5501/1 
into action. t()I) 
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This occurred immediately. NSC 5501/l, created 31 
January, led to the launching of "Operation Spotlight" on 12 
February. 110 Balloons dropping a million copies of Swiatlo' s 
book on Poland, provided the Poles with documentary evidence 
of the government's perfidy. The purpose of Operation 
Spotlight was to weaken the communist apparatus of control 
and to better enable the Polish people to defend themselves 
against this structure in the future and to remind the Poles 
of the West's interest in them. As Eisenhower stated on 8 
February, the United States and Radio Free Europe were out 
to win the battle for men's minds. Only as long as the 
peoples behind the Iron Curtain knew the outside world had 
not forgotten them, only that long would they remain as 
potential deterrents to Soviet aggression. 111 
The success of Operation Spotlight was immediately 
apparent due to the Soviet and Polish governments' strong 
denunciation of it. Radio Free Europe defended itself and 
the balloon operation by pointing out that abnormal actions 
1~olt, Radio Free Europe, 20-27. 
11°For more on Operation Spotlight: "Operation 
Spotlight," News From Behind the Iron Curtain, March 1955, 
37; "Polish Reactions to Radio Free Europe's Swiatlo 
Pamphlet and 'Operation Spotlight' Campaign," Records of the 
Department of state Relating to the Internal Affairs of 
Poland, 1955-1959 15 July 1955. Twenty three reports are 
included in this despatch. 
111United States Presidents. Public Papers, 1955, 251. 
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had to be taken as the communists themselves had created 
abnormal conditions when they had subjugated the countries 
and denied them access to information. In every free state, 
people had unlimited access to information, such as in 
London where Izvestia and Pravda could be purchased. 112 
Radio Free Europe and NSC 5501/1 were more than willing to 
fill the information gap of the satellit~ peoples. 
Meanwhile, the administration drew up plans in the 
event of an uprising in Eastern Europe. Eisenhower, 
convinced that the Soviets would prevent the success of any 
uprising, determined that the United States would do the 
same and no more as it had done during the East German riots 
in June 1953. America would not: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
precipitate hostilities(by providing arms or 
logistical support) 
alienate its allies 
cause uprisings and consequent annihilation of the 
people on the basis of exhortations or promises 
which the United States was not able to support113 
The United States had made it clear that it would cause as 
many difficulties for the satellite regimes as it could and 
try to weaken their power, but America would not risk war or 
its allies for Eastern Europe. The fine line between the 
112"Radio Free Europe Speaks," News From Behind the Iron 
curtain, March 1955, 38. 
m"Analysis of Action to be Taken in the Event of an 
East European Uprising," FRUS, vol. 25, Eastern Europe 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1990), 10-11. This also reflected 
Eisenhower's personal view, as he wrote in his diary on 22 
January 1952: "The purpose of America is to defend a way of 
life rather than merely to defend property, territory, 
homes, or lives." Immerman, Diplomatic History, 328. 
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public and vocal policy of liberation and che actual policy 
of resisting sovietization was now apparent. 
Although unlikely to achieve concrete results, 
Eisenhower remained open to negotiating with the soviets. 
This desire prompted his statement to the press in March, "I 
have said time and again, there is no place on this earth to 
which I would not travel, there is no chore I would not 
undertake, if I had the faintest hope that, by so doing, I 
would promote the general cause of world peace. 11114 This 
sentence left the next move to the Soviets. The Soviet 
Union had been trying to promote its international image of 
peace, so Eisenhower challenged the Soviet leaders to act on 
their words. Eisenhower sought a deed on their behalf to 
signal a willingness to solve the problems between them. 
As the Soviets remained quiet, the United States 
resumed action on NSC 5501/1 in order to exploit communist 
vulnerabilities and achieve objectives set out in NSC 174. 
on 22 April, the New York Times reported that the State 
Department had prodded the Soviets to disclose the fate of 
sixteen leaders of the Polish underground who had been 
arrested after World War II. It stated that "so far at the 
United States Government is aware" four men have not 
returned to Poland. This note also not so subtly reminded 
114Quoted in Graebner, The New Isolationism, 214. 
Europe that even though the soviets were trying to make 
friends there, they have never been generous or humane. 115 
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Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, trying to show that it did 
have "friends," signed the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955. 116 
The pact, a direct response to West Germany joining NATO, 
provided for cooperation and mutual assistance between the 
soviet Union and the People's Republics of Albania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the 
German Democratic Republic. The pact was to be a "Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance" in 
accordance with the UN charter. The members would strive 
for the universal reduction of arms and the prohibition of 
atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. A 
joint command was established and if one of the members were 
attacked, the other members would come to its aid. 
The Warsaw Pact did little more than put into polite 
words the reality of the Soviet Union's domination of the 
area. What was both surprising and welcome to the West was 
the Soviet union's signing of the Austrian ~reaty on 15 May. 
The soviets had never signed a peace treaty with Austria 
ending World War II as this allowed them to maintain some 
m"united states Seeks Word of Jailed Poles," New York 
Times, 22 April 1955, 5. 
116For further reading on the Warsaw Pact: N. Edwina 
Moreton, East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance: The Politics 
of Detente (Boulder, co: Westview Press, 1978); Robin Alison 
Remington, The Warsaw Pact; Case Studies in Communist 
Conflict Resolution (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971). 
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troops in that country. 117 The treaty, calling for a 
neutral Austria and for a withdrawal of all troops from 
within her borders, was a major step for the Soviet Union; 
the United States interpreted it as concrete proof of the 
Soviet Union's willingness to do more than talk about peace. 
This single act, performed more than two months after 
Eisenhower's challenge, pavec the way for a four power 
conference held in Geneva in July. The soviet Union had 
wanted a summit meeting and it now had it; the United states 
had wanted deeds and not words and it had that. Each side 
was looking forward to the conference, albeit with a 
cautious eye. 
Publicly hailing the conference, Eisenhower felt that 
the world was making a steady, if slow, march towards real, 
secure, permanent peace. He stated the world was nearer to 
the ideals that had been fought for in World War II, but in 
private, he was cautious. Dulles was even more skeptical. 
Worried that the Soviet Union wanted the Geneva Conference 
for propaganda and prestige reasons and not for real 
problem-solving reasons, he believed that the offers of 
meetings should be turned down unless there was some 
probQbility of success. Dulles absolutely did not want 
117The Russians stalled the completion of a treaty with 
Austria because they wanted to keep troops there. With 
troops in Austria, they had an excuse to keep soldiers in 
Hungary and Romania as well. In order to gain its 
independence, Austria agreed to be a neutral nation and a 
treaty was finally signed. 
67 
Geneva to become a spectacle and promote false euphoria. He 
knew that the difficulties of the world could not be solved 
in one meeting and he worried that the public might not 
realize this. As the conference neared, the tone out of 
Washington became more careful. Eisenhower and Dulles began 
to stress that the meeting would not settle matters of 
importance, but "would be concerned with finding 
approaches' by which progress toward a resolution of 
difficult problems might be made." 118 
The United States goals at Geneva were: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
progress towards the unification of Germany without 
neutralizing or demilitarizing Germany or subtrac-
ting it from NATO 
"european security" in terms of decreasing the num-
bers and control of forces in the Soviet area with-
out consolidating the Soviet grip in Eastern Europe 
the leveling and control of armaments (which will 
build-in United States superiority) 
increased independence and growth of self-
determination on the part of the satellites 
an end to Soviet support of International Communism 
as a hostile, revolutionary body 
the opportunity to reach people of the Soviet bloc 
with knowledge and ideas 
(marginal) the Soviet participation in the "Atoms 
for Peace" plan119 
In estimating the prospect of the United States achieving 
its goals, it was found that the first two goals were linked 
and should be remitted to the Foreign Minister's meeting 
118A.J. Goodpaster Memorandum of Meeting with the 
President, 22 July 1955, Box 1, International Meeting 
Series, Office of the Staff Secretary. 
119u.s. Goals at Geneva, 11 July 1955, Box 1, 
International Meeting Series, Office· of the Staff Secretary; 
Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation, 158. 
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that would occur later in the fall. There might be some 
progress on the third and sixth goals and progress on the 
fifth might be made privately. on the fourth goal, relating 
to self-determination for the satellites, it was 
acknowledged that it would be difficult to have any formal 
undertaking of the issue from the Soviets as they will 
refuse to have it as a proper topic for discussion. 
Some Soviet aims were assumed to be: 
(1) the appearance that the West has conceded to the 
Soviet rulers a moral and social equality which will 
help them maintain their rule in the satellites by 
disheartening resistance 
(2) relaxation of military activities by the West, such 
as NATO activities and the issue of German rearma-
ment 
(3) nuclear disarmament without extensive safeguards1w 
With this in mind, a psychological strategy was drawn up for 
the Geneva Conference in which the United States was to 
capture the political and psychological imagination of the 
world. Assuming that the Soviets would use the conference 
in order to gain a psychological advantage rather than to 
conduct serious diplomatic negotiation, the proposals 
introduced at Geneva were to be more important than the 
actual results of the conference. The best way for the 
United States to show the Soviet Union's insincerity, while 
demonstrating the true desire of the United states for peace 
and for the welfare of others, was by introducing the 
satellite issue that the Soviet Union was known not to want 
120soviet Goals at Geneva 11 July 1955, Box 1, 
International Meeting Series, Office of the Staff Secretary. 
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to discuss. The United States would thereby strengthen its 
moral and ethical position by calling for a plebiscite in 
the satellite countries. 
This issue could be tied to European security as the 
Soviet Union was very interested in that topic. It had been 
proposed that at the opening of the conference, the 
President mention the Soviet Union's illegal control over 
the satellites and state that this was a major factor 
contributing to American distrust of the Soviets. The 
United States could also ask the UN to submit recommenda-
tions regarding the holding of plebiscites, but if a more 
direct attack was needed, a mention would be made that the 
end of the war agreements calling for free elections should 
be honored. 121 
Eisenhower did just that in his opening speech at 
Geneva on 18 July: 
[The American people] feel strongly that certain 
peoples of Eastern Europe .•• have not yet been given the 
benefit of this pledge [of self-determination] of our 
United Nations wartime declaration, reinforced by other 
wartime agreements. 
Premier Bulganin responded: 
It is common knowledge that the regime of people's 
democracies has been established in those countries by 
the people themselves of their own free will. Besides, 
nobody has authorized us to consider the state of af-
fairs in these countries. Thus, there are no grounds for 
discussing this question at our Conference. 1n 
121Ibid. 
inKovrig, The Myth of Liberation, 159. 
Needless to say, no resolution on the satellites was 
reached at Geneva. The greatest idea to come out of the 
meeting was the so-called "Spirit of Geneva." World 
tensions decreased as both sides agreed that neither would 
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start a forced change of the status quo. What was important 
was the use of the word "forced." Force, or overt aggres-
sion, would not be employed as a method for change, but the 
struggle continued and propaganda remained as important as 
ever. The United states, stressing its aim of liberation 
through Radio Free Europe in order that the East European 
countries not feel abandoned by the West, reasoned that if 
the Soviet Union accepted the status quo, then there was no 
need for them to hold onto the satellites for security 
reasons. It appeared that the Soviets worried less about 
the United States' use of force than its use of propaganda 
to turn the peoples of Eastern Europe against the Soviet 
Union. While American military strength could be combatted 
with Soviet nuclear weapons, the war for men's minds was the 
harder one to win. 
Upon returning to Washington, Eisenhower and Dulles 
expressed caution. Eisenhower stated that there was 
"evidence of a new friendliness in the world," but that time 
alone would tell what was achieved at Geneva. 1n He 
ref erred to the follow-up meeting in October when the 
mQuoted in: "President Says Time Will Tell What Geneva 
Achieved," New York Times, 25 July 1955, 1. 
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foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, 
Great Britain, and France were to meet to try to work out 
the details of problems confronting the relationship between 
these countries. The United States, holding no illusions 
about the Soviet leaders or their system and still desiring 
the freedom of the satellites, continued to hope for peace 
and that the "Geneva spirit" would produce it. Until the 
meeting in October was over, however, the Soviet Union was 
still a threat. 
The OCB, still busy looking for ways to combat the 
Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, produced another list of 
guidelines on 21 September. Regardless of the Geneva 
spirit, no changes appeared within the satellite countries 
and progress towards liberation remained slow and 
intermittent. The new list included approaches to be 
supported: exploit any communist process that claimed 
adherence to democratic procedures; stress the West's 
interest in the welfare of Eastern Europe; the United States 
should continue to write notes to the East European 
governments on national holidays; stress freedom of 
religion, as well as the fact that satellite troops were 
merely to become cannon fodder in a war, etc. The list was 
little different from that first proposed by NSC 174, but 
these actions remained effective. As to Poland 
specifically, the United States encouraged religious freedom 
and maintenance of national traditions. Additionally, a 
shift occurred, a moving away from a blanket attack on all 
communists in the country as it was concluded that many in 
the government were Polish nationalists who were actually 
trying to aid their own country and not Moscow. These 
people were to be encouraged in their efforts. 
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The spirit of Geneva waned by the end of October as the 
foreign minister's meeting accomplished little and the 
soviets withdrew to their former posture of antagonism 
toward the West. 124 The success and publicity of the West's 
escapee and refugee programs had become a thorn in the side 
of the communist regimes as these programs mocked the 
government's claims of superiority to the West. The Kremlin 
thus decided to make these escapees and refugees the target 
of their own propaganda through a "redefection" campaign. 125 
Accordingly, Polish embassies in the West increased the 
numbers of films and publications that they showed, 
sponsored lectures, circulated letters from relatives at 
124The Poles had worried the West would be "taken in" by 
the Soviets, ·but were relieved when at the foreign 
minister's meeting the West showed that they saw the 
unchanging nature of the Soviet's long-range aims. For a 
full post-Geneva analysis of the Poles' feelings on Geneva, 
as viewed by the American Embassy, see: Records of the 
Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of 
Poland, 1955-1959, 19 January 1956. 
125For more on the Soviet redefection campaign: "Emigre 
Go Home," News from Behind the Iron Curtain, October 1955, 
3-13. Also see numerous foreign service despatches dated 
14,30 June, 20, 27 July, 3 October, 10 November, 6 December 
6 1955, 16 January, 10 February 1956 in Records of the 
Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of 
Poland. 1955-1959. 
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home, and placed agents among the youth to describe the 
wonders of their true homeland. The embassies also used 
propaganda to try to split the exile leaders from the 
ordinary refugees. The campaign was actually somewhat 
effective as some refugees did return home either out of 
sentiment or because of the problems T.hey encountered in the 
West that they did not know how to handle. These people 
were then put on Radio Warsaw in an effort to destroy the 
allure of the free world. 
The United States Information Agency, created 1 August 
1953 out of the recommendations of the Jackson Committee 
report, was busy trying to counter Soviet redefection 
efforts. The goal o· · USIA' s program was to encourage 
defection through the use of film, press, radio, news on 
escapees and interviews with resettled refugees. The agency 
explained the problems and accomplishments of the West in 
dealing with the refugees, reemphasized Western interest in 
the escapees, and challenged the Soviet Union to prove that 
Iron curtain conditions had improved. The American 
counterattack prompted a visit by Romuald Spasowski, Polish 
Ambassador to the United States, to Robert Murphy, Deputy 
Under Secretary of State. In discussing Polish repatria-
tion, Spasowski stated that "Poles belong to Poland" and 
requested that American immigration officials suggest to 
Poles that they return "home." Murphy summarily refused, 
noting that the American position held that people should be 
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allowed to live where they wish. Spasowski replied that he 
had hoped for a more "positive attitude'' on the part of the 
American authorities •126 
Dulles reacted to this campaign in a speech to the 
Illinois Manufacturers Association in Chicago, announcing a 
new phase of the struggle against international communism. 
He called the postwar decade a phase of violence and the 
threat of violence now appeared to be in "eclipse;" however, 
Vladimir Illych Lenin and Stalin had both emphasized the 
need for tactical "zigzag." The communists, according to 
Dulles, were merely changing their tactics, not their 
purpose. 127 
Apparent evidence of this dualism in Soviet tactics 
existed in the treaty signing with Austria and additionally, 
in another state Department press release dated 23 December 
1955. It mentioned Eisenhower's statement at Geneva on 22 
July, 
To help achieve the goal of peace based on justice 
and right and mutual understanding, there are certain 
concrete steps that could be taken: 
(1) to lower the barriers which now impede the inter-
change of information and ideas between 
peoples .•.• 128 
126
"Secretary of State for Political Action," FROS, vol. 
25, Eastern Europe, 96. 
127Peter v. Curl, ed., Documents on American Foreian 
Relations 1955 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), 12-13. 
12811Revival of Russian-Language Magazine 'Amerika, '" The 
Department of State Bulletin, 2 January 1956, 18. 
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and explained that a note had been sent to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union requesting action on 
this statement. The United States proposed the publication 
of an illustrated cultural and nonpolitical monthly magazine 
in the Russian language, Amerika, that would be devoted to 
the objective presentation of various aspects of American 
life and would be a concrete step toward a fuller 
interchange of information and ideas. surprisingly, the 
Soviets zigged and accepted the proposal without requiring a 
preview of the magazine. 
Thus, this chapter has shown that while the Eisen-
hower administration maintained liberation as a long-term 
goal as ref erred to by the President as late as the Geneva 
Conference, policy became focused on short-term actions. 
Eisenhower and Dulles wanted to know what could be done now, 
both to achieve liberation in the future and to frustrate 
the Soviet Union in the present. NSC 158 stated that 
psychological objectives were the best method of achieving 
both, and NSC 174 and 5501/1 provided the means of achieving 
these objectives. A few of the many examples include the 
efforts of Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, American 
participation in and exploitation of refugee and escapee 
programs, the United States' commitment to reawakening 
satellite peoples' national traditions and to their eventual 
liberation, and the United States' continued efforts to 
increase tensions within the bloc and between it and the 
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Soviet Union. The coming year, 1956, would let the United 
states know to what extent its short-term goal of maximizing 
the soviet Union's difficulties and preventing the 
sovietizaton of captive peoples had succeeded. 
IV. 1956: THE LITMUS TEST 
President Eisenhower, continuing with efforts to keep 
alive the hope of liberation, sent a Christmas message over 
Radio Free Europe to the peoples of Eastern Europe stating: 
During the Christmas season, I want you to know that 
the American people recognize the trials under which you 
are suffering; join you in your concern for the restora-
tion of individual freedoms and political liberty; and 
share your faith that right in the end will prevail to 
bring you once again among the free nations of the 
world. f29 
This short broadcast produced unexpected results. An· 
angered, Khrushchev sent a note to the United States 
denouncing the message as "in no way accord[ing) with the 
spirit of Geneva, 11130 but Eisenhower rejected Khrushchev's 
note because it had been made clear to the Soviets at Geneva 
that the United States still hoped to achieve liberty for 
the oppressed peoples of Europe. 131 
129Quoted in: "United States Position of Liberation of 
Captive Peoples," The Department of State Bulletin, 16 
January 1956, 84. 
130Ibid. 
131Refers to Eisenhower's opening speech at Geneva, see 
page 75. 
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On 5 January 1956 the President emphasized the United 
States' continued aim of liberation in his State of the 
Union Message: "The peaceful liberation of the captive 
peoples has been, is, and, until success is achieved, will 
continue to be a major goal of United States foreign 
policy. 11132 "Our world policy and our actions are dedicated 
to the achievement of peace for all nations." In July 1955 
the heads of governments had held out the promise for a 
decrease in bitterness, but the failure of the Foreign 
Minister's meeting in October showed that the "Soviet 
leaders are not yet willing to create the indispensable 
conditions for a secure and lasting peace." The soviet 
policy, according to Eisenhower, was zigzagging as it had 
shifted from an open reliance on military force to a policy 
of "division, enticement, and duplicity. 11133 He concluded 
that this zigzag was the result of Soviet objectives being 
thwarted by the free world rather than the successes of 
their objectives being met; thus, the United States would 
continue its efforts to frustrate Soviet aims. 
In speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
the next day, Dulles mentioned the satellites and told the 
committee that strong forces were building within them for 
change and that he and Eisenhower wanted the satellite 
countries' governments to respond to the national will of 
t32Graebner, New Isolationism, 236. 
133Israel, State of the Union Messages, 3054. 
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the people and to provide some independence for their 
countries as Tito had done. 1~ Radio Free Europe's balloons 
sent into Eastern Europe carrying anti-communist propaganda 
were seen as one effective means of bringing about that 
change in Eastern Europe. 
Another reason for furthering such actions was the 
continuance of the communist redefection campaign. If the 
West ended its propaganda campaign while the communists 
continued theirs, it might appear as if the West had 
abandoned the satellites. The Eisenhower administration 
concluded that the best policy was to give the Soviet Union 
just what it did not want. 
on 25 February, Khrushchev shocked the world when, in a 
secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, he condemned 
Stalin and the methods of terror he used against his own 
people. With one speech, Khrushchev brought a new ray of 
hope to the world of more open relations between East and 
West and of a thaw within the societies and cultures of the 
satellites. The United States government w~lcomed this 
speech, but it still remained cautious. Unsure that this 
was not another example of the Soviets• zigzag policy, the 
United states would study the Soviet Union's actions for 
signs of change, while it continued with its own agenda. 
1~United states Senate, Executive Sessions of the 
committee on Foreign Relations, 84th cong., 2d sess., 6 
January 1956, 5. 
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Accordingly, a new progress report on NSC 174 presented 
on 29 February, covering the time period from 1 May 1954 to 
29 February 1956, listed some of the actions taken as a 
result of NSC 174's earlier guidelines. The report noted 
that the information programs were continuing as planned, 
that the recommendation to offer agricultural goods to the 
satellites had been acted upon in the case of the Danube 
flood. The exploitation of any internal conflicts within 
ruling groups and the assurance of American interest in the 
area's future and freedom were furthered at every 
opportunity, and continued attempts were made for an 
increase in cultural contacts. No evidence of progress 
towards the long range objective of liberation was found 
during this period; nevertheless this fact did not change 
the validity of the policy . 135 In sum, the long-term goal 
of liberation seemed as far off as before, but actions could 
and should still be taken to bring it nearer as there was 
now a hint that there would be some easing of Soviet 
pressures on the satellites. 
In discussing this report on 22 March, the NSC noted 
the difficulty the OCB had encountered in devising effective 
courses of action and that as far as concrete gains went, 
the United states had achieved little. Dulles replied that 
the hope of liberation was not gone as the Soviet Union had 
135Progress Report, 2 9 February 19 5 6, Box 8 , NSC Series, 
Off ice of the Special Assistant for National Secuity 
Affairs. 
not advanced in any area in the world, an~ Eisenhower 
maintained that the United States must not be any less 
aggressive in pursuing the objectives just because it had 
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not achieved the progress it would like to see. Feelings of 
hope and the spirit of resistance to the soviets were hard 
to quantify, but it did not mean that they did not exist or 
could not be worked with. The NSC and the OCB were to 
continue the work and hope that the Soviets would encounter 
increased troubles with the satellites.u6 
At the same time, the Donovan Emergency Commission of 
the International Rescue Committee to Investigate Communist 
Redefection Campaigns presented its report. Completing a 
list of recommendations to counter the Soviet campaign to 
entice escapees to return to the Soviet Union and to other 
East European countries, the group recomended that the 
United States should: 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
arouse the free world against the Communist 
redef ection campaign and to the need for more 
effective counteraction 
expand cooperation with other nations on behalf of 
refugees from communism, coordinate.programs and 
share equally the burdens of their care 
first priority should be to speeding the processing 
of refugee cases and to simplifying the process 
a program is needed to strengthen the morale among 
refugees and to provide follow-up counseling for 
them for one year after resettlement 
1362aoth Meeting of the NSC, 22 March 1956, Box 7, NSC 
Series, Ann Whitman File. 
(5) special measures need to be taken for the care of 
the old, ill and incapacitated137 
These suggestions advanced the short-term aims of NSC 
174 as Dulles and Eisenhower wanted. Another program to 
promote these aims was the dissemination of western books 
abroad, through which the United States hoped to increase 
affinity for America and counter Soviet propaganda. An 
example included technical knowledge being made available 
through the USIA's 160 libraries abroad in order to aid 
economic development. 138 
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Another progress report, appearing on 18 April, 
indicated that the administration's propaganda efforts were 
producing the desired results. Concerning the American 
policy on Soviet and satellite defectors, this report 
mentioned the soviet redefection effort, compared it to 
United States information programs and concluded that the 
American programs toward escapees and defectors continued to 
contribute to the achievement of United States 
objectives. 139 
137Donovan Emergency Commission of the International 
Rescue Committee to Investigate Communist Redefection 
Campaigns, 20 March 1956, Box 63, Subject Series, Confi-
dential File. 
138Dan Lacy, "The Role of American Books Abroad," 
Foreign Affairs, April 1956, 414. 
139u. s. Policy on Soviet and Satellite Defectors, 18 
April 1956, Box 1, NSC Series, Office of the Special 
Assistant for National Security Affiars. Also, as a point of 
interest, to date there were 1,700,000 escapees and refugees 
from Communism. 
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Beginning in March and continuing through May, mixed 
signals came out of Poland. A 12 May New York Times article 
related the Polish leaders' attacks on American policy 
toward Poland. These leaders felt deep resentment at the 
attempts of the United States to weaken Poland's 
relationship with the Soviet Union. "If you would accept 
this and act on it relations between Poland and the United 
States would improve enormously," stated Joseph Winniewicz, 
Deputy Foreign Minister. Another Polish official remarked, 
" We do not expect Americans to praise us or to say 
beautiful things about us, but we do expect normal 
politeness and decency. 11140 
Meanwhile, through other channels, the United as 
was receiving a different picture of the situation within 
Poland. Cominform141 was dissolved on 17 April and the 
Soviet Union improved relations with Tito by recognizing 
different roads to socialism, 1a thus giving the Polish 
140Sydney Gruson, "Poles Resent Prodding by United 
States on Warsaw's Ties to Moscow," New York Times, 12 May 
1956, 3. 
141cominform, short for Communist Information Bureau, 
was established in 1947 to spread communist propaganda. The 
Warsaw Pact, an outgrowth of Cominform, made this 
organization superfluous and it was dissolved 17 April 1956. 
142There had exited a Tito-Stalin split as Tito had 
refused to follow Moscow's orders on how to govern 
Yugoslavia. Khrushchev went to Belgrade to try to improve 
relations between the two countries by ~ecognizing different 
roads to socialism. For more on Tito and his battles with 
Moscow, see Iva Banac, With Stalin Against Tito: 
Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism (Ithaca: Corness 
University Press,1988); Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: 
people hope for their own road to socialism. Although no 
Polish policy independent of Moscow had yet emerged, there 
appeared to be less outright injustice against the people. 
For instance, in recognition of severe economic hardships, 
the regime dropped the Five Year Plan and tried to 
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compensate by making promises; however, "the chances for an 
immediate improvement in the standard of living are 
dismal. "143 
on 26 May, a letter arrived at Radio Free Europe from a 
Polish listener describing the situation in his country: 
All of us Poles greet your brave President Eisen-
hower as the leader of Europe. The whole of Poland also 
sends you, Mr. President, sincere greetings and honest 
thoughts from behind the Iron Curtain. We Poles place 
our only hope in you, the only father of the nation, 
and we look forward all the time to the removal of the 
Iron curtain. only one thing pleases us, that you have 
armed superiority and hydrogen bombs, for this is the 
only thing Khrushchev and his henchmen are afraid of, 
despite the fact that the Iron Curtain makes much noise 
and spreads hostile propaganda that it wants peace. Why 
does it arm? There is no day without tanks, artillery 
and ammunition being transported against West Germany. 
It is being armed to the teeth. All factories are being 
transformed into one great war arsenal. Slanderous 
propaganda is being spread abroad about reductions in 
military manpower but this had been going on for two 
years and no soldiers have gone home. People are being 
deported to Siberian mines or thrown into prison. 
Millions of people work for nothing, men and women are 
shot and hanged, children taken to orphanages, kolkhozes 
established by force. Thus work proceeds according to 
the soviet model. Patrols rove in villages and 
Arno Press, 1972); Vladimir Dedi)er, Tito Speaks: His Self-
Portrait and struggle with Stalin (London: Reader's Union, 
1954); Slobodan M. Draskovich, Tito, Moscow's Trojan Horse 
(Chicago: H. Regency Co., 1957). 
143
"Ferment and the Polish Economy," News From Behind 
the Iron Curtain, April 1956, 10. 
settlements and the UB listens in to private 
conversations to see whom it can arrest. Led by the 
present police ••• (illegible) ••• the NKVD. 
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Well then, dear countrymen, broadcast more programs 
in Polish, at the end of each program or news bulletin 
have the times of the next bulletin. When you broadcast 
your news bulletin in Polish, speak close to the micro-
phone. Jamming is of no avail and we can hear a clear 
voice well in our receivers in Poland. Well now, while 
you talk into the microphone, you should lengthen or 
shorten the wavelength. The Iron Curtain will fail with 
its jamming for while listening we can always shift the 
knob a millimeter this way or that and we hear a clear 
voice. As for the enemy, he tunes to the wavelength at 
the beginning, sets his machine going and makes his 
awful racket without realizing that the broadcast 
wavelength has been shortened or lengthened by one 
millimeter. 
Countrymen, criticize as much as you can for this 
has a negative effect on the Iron Curtain. Countrymen, 
send us arms, ammunition, radio transmitters by balloon 
so that we might establish contact with you and remain 
in constant contact. In this way we shall be able to 
tell you about everything that happens in Poland •. This 
is what we need most against our enemy the Iron 
curtain. Countrymen, if the Iron Curtain lets this 
letter through and you receive it, acknowledge it by 
radio on June 17th or June 24th, 1956, at 22:00 hours 
Polish time. We shall exclusively await an answer from 
you on those days. If we get an answer, you shall 
receive a large number of letters with all kinds of 
information at this or another of your addresses. 
we Polish Poles greet our relatives abroad and wish 
that we many meet as soon as possible and prosper to-
gether. We wish for freedom and a truly free Poland, 
not the kind we have today where a pack of cigarettes 
costs 3 zloty while the worker can only.earn 10 zloty a 
day. Shoes cost 670 zloty and the worker must labor a 
whole month and can only manage to earn 600 zloty. And 
what is one to live on for a whole month? A suit of 
clothes costs 1,500 zloty for which a worker must labor 
two and a half months. And what is he to live on and 
support his family on in the meantime? If he wants to 
do that the can't buy anything. Everyone is thus forced 
to carry a pistol, steal, assault, rob banks and so on 
since it isn't worth while to work under this communist 
system. 144 
1«Letter to Radio Free Europe, 17 July. 1956, Box. 44, 
Jackson Papers. 
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The author of this letter thus confirmed Eisenhower's 
assessment of the situation in Eastern Europe. The hope for 
liberation was not dead in the satellite countries, and 
American propaganda efforts had helped in preventing 
sovietization •145 
The new American Ambassador in Poland, Joseph E. 
JacobsJ sent a note on 29 May to the Department of State 
giving his views on the liberalization trend or "thaw" in 
Poland. Observing that things were more optimistically 
treated in the West than was warranted, he stated that there 
was no evidence of a change in Soviet policy and that any 
zigzag was due merely to expediency in addressing issues in 
Poland. As to the Poles' own road to socialism, their 
divergence from the soviet Union represented the Polish 
regime's attempts to deal with the unique issues in Poland 
(e.g., the Catholic Church), that traditional Communist 
Party methods failed to address. 1~ The Soviet army was 
145Also interesting is a joke popular at the time in 
Poland: A Polish Party member explaining to·another Party 
member why he had the portraits of Khrushchev, Stalin, the 
Holy Father, and Eisenhower on the wall of his room ••• "I say 
my prayers before each of them beginning this way: To 
Khrushchev I say •our Father' to Stalin "who art in heaven' 
to the Holy Father 'hallowed be thy name' and to Eisenhower 
'thy kingdom come.'" Records of the Department of State 
Relating to the Internal Affairs of Poland. 1955-1959, 27 
March 1956. 
1~In an earlier telegram, the American Embassy in 
Warsaw had written: "Polish regime leaders have followed 
soviet lead in laying down line that criticism cult 
individuals does not (repeat not) mean freedom to criticize 
basic party policy." Telegram form Warsaw to the Department 
of State, Records of the Department of State Relating to the 
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still in Poland and the "old Communist stooges of the Soviet 
Union [were still] in control •••. Embassy believes 'changes' 
well under control. 11 147 
On the other hand, in a news conference on 27 June, 
Dulles stated that international communism was in a state of 
perplexity and at internal odds because certain basic truths 
have caught up with it: 
(1) it has difficulty being an effective instrument of 
the cold war without the iron discipline and brutal 
terrorism used by Stalin 
(2) such rule will not be indefinitely tolerated by 
those subjects unless it produces a succession of 
victories148 
As there had been no recent victories, Dulles reasoned that 
it was safe to assume that satellite people's toleration of 
such rule was low. 
In Poland toleration was very low and the 10 June issue 
of Po Prostu carried three articles on economic problems in 
Poland: one about "the problem which does not exist" or high 
unemployment; another on the problems with machinery and 
inefficiency in Lodz, a cotton center; the last about "the 
price of the plan" or the poor conditions in factories due 
to bad and overcentralized planning. If these articles 
could make the Polish press, then they were only a pale 
Internal Affairs of Poland. 1955-1959, 8 May 1956. 
147us Embassy Despatch to the Department of state, 29 
May 1956, FRUS, vol. 25, Eastern Europe, 173-74. 
148Peter v. Curl, ed., Documents on American Foreiqn 
Relations, 1956 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), 205. 
reflection of the attitude of the population as the com-
munists would never reveal the true extent of their 
failures •149 
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For the workers at locomotive factory, Works in the 
Name of Stalin at Poznan, or ZIPSO, production norms had 
continually increased over the past few years while average 
wages had declined three to five percent since 1954. 1~ 
Earnings had decreased due to excessive tax deductions, the 
workers claiming that the regime had illegally deducted 
eleven million zlotys from their overtime pay. The 
employees wanted the money repaid. In addition, section W 
of ZIPSO received bad supplies that made it impossible to 
fulfill production norms, resulting in a wage cut. Meeting 
on 23 June to discuss the problem, the workers agreed to 
send a delegation of thirty men to Warsaw to seek relief 
from their difficult situation. The delegation left on 
Monday, 25 June, for the headquarters of the Metal Worker's 
Union and Ministry of Machine Industry. 
When the delegates had not returned by Wednesday, 27 
June, rumors began circulating in Poznan.that the delegation 
had been arrested and consequently the workers decided to 
149Konrad Syrop, Spring in October; The story of the 
Polish Revolution, 1956 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1957), 46-48. 
1~Ib 'd 48 1 • ' • 
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act on their own. 151 On the morning of 28 June, carrying 
posters demanding bread, lower prices and higher wages, the 
frustrated workers marched two miles into the town center. 
Other people joined them in their march and by 10 AM a large 
crowd had gathered in front of the Town Hall. People 
initially sang religious hymns and patriotic songs in 
protest to the government, but the tone soon became more 
political and revolutionary. Anti-communist and anti-Soviet 
slogans appeared and there were cries of: "Down with the 
Russians," "We want Freedom," "Down with false Communism," 
and "Down with the Soviet Occupation." 
Becoming increasingly inflamed, the crowd grew violent, 
rushing the jail and freeing the prisoners. While some 
destroyed the radio station that was responsible for jamming 
western broadcasts, others gathered arms and chaos ruled the 
streets. When the crowd attacked the Security Police 
building at 11 AM, the first shot was fired. The Polish 
Militia arrived soon afterward but did not fire at the 
crowd, some soldiers joining the crowd in ibs protest. By 
evening, however, the army arrived to quell the riot and by 
Friday morning, 29 June, the riot was over. In all it had 
claimed 54 lives and wounded over 200. 
Both the government and the Polish people clearly 
understood that the demonstrators had not intended for a 
151The rumors were false. The delegation had been held 
up in Warsaw by bureaucrats and were returning to Poznan by 
train. 
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riot to occur. They had only wanted their grievances heard, 
but the riot also showed the government that the economic 
situation was so serious that the workers were now very 
bitter and ready to fight for better conditions, and the 
regime now had proof that the population was against its 
rule. The Polish government sent the Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers, Jozef cyrankiewicz, to Poznan for 
damage control. Arriving on 29 June, he spoke to the people 
saying that every Pole and the entire society condemned the 
riot brought about by provocateurs. He acknowledged the 
workers grievances and promised that they would be 
addressed, "We are talking among ourselves frankly ••• ," he 
began, but hostile a;ents wantir.g to hamper the progress of 
the process of democratization had taken advantage of the 
workers' grievances to stage a revolt and to make Poland 
look bad. He thundered: "anyone who lifts his hand against 
the people's authority shall have that hand cut off!"is2 
cyrankiewicz and the communist paper, Trybuna Ludu condemned 
provocateurs and accused foreign agents at length. 153 
152Paul E. Zinner, ed., National Communism and Popular 
Revolt in Eastern Europe; A Collection of Documents on 
Events in Poland and Hungary February-November 1956 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1956), 136. Also, US 
Embassy in Warsaw telegram to the Secretary of State 30 June 
1956, Records of the Department of State Relating to the 
Internal Affairs of Poland, 1955-1959. 
153For more on the Poznan riot, see Antoni czubinski, 
Poznan czerwiec 1956-1981 (Poznan: Drajowa Agencja 
Wydawnicza, 1981); Lucja Ludaszewicz, Dramat nadziei 
poznanski czerwiec 1956 (Poznan: Wielkopolska Inicjatywa 
Wydawnicza, 1983); Jaroslawa Maciejewskiego and Zofii 
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The United States was similarly surprised by the riots. 
Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
telephoned his brother, John Foster Dulles, on 28 June 
informing him of the riot in Poznan. Said John Foster 
Dulles: "when they begin to crack ••• they can crack fast. We 
have to keep the pressure on."1S4 Twenty-nine June was a 
busy day for the administration. Secretary of State Dulles 
held a staff meeting that addressed the problem of exploi-
ting the unrest in the satellites brought to light by the 
Poznan riots. The United States was to be "on the 
offensive." Actions proposed at the meeting included the 
preparation of guidelines for USIA to exploit the riots, and 
the intent that USIA would publicize Soviet foreign aid 
programs and claims seeking to make the Soviet Union 
acknowledge or deny their validity--especially as no aid had 
been given to the Poznan area to ease the plight of the 
Trojanowicz, Poznanski czerwiec 1956 (Poznan: Wydawnictwo 
Poznanskie, 1990); Edward Jan Nalepa, Pacyfikacja 
abuntovanego miasta: Wojsko Polskie w czerwcu 1956r. w 
Poznaniu w swietle dokumentow wojskowych (Warszawa: 
Wydawnicza Bellona, 1992); Jan Nowak, Polska droga ku 
wolnosci 1952-1973 (London: Gryf Publications, 1974); Jan 
Nowak, Polska z oddali: wspomnienia (Krakow: Znak, 1992); 
Poznan 1956-Grudzien 1970 (Paris: instytut Literacki, 1971); 
Marek Tarniewski, Porcja wolnosci (Warszawa: Wydawnicza G. 
o. Solidarni, 1989); Zofia Trojanowicz, Poznanski czerwiec 
1956 (Gdynia: np, 1981); Edmund Tuliszka, o wypakdach 
poznanskiego czerwca 1956r. (Poznan: Buuro Prasowe MKZ 
Wielkopolska, 1981); also see Records of the Department of 
State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Poland, 1955-1959 
in this period for American analysis of the situation. 
tS4Allen Dulles Call to Dulles, 28 June 1956, Box 5, 
Telephone Call Series, Dulles Papers. 
w~rkers there. Later in the day, Dulles and Allen Dulles 
discussed the possibility of making an offer of foodstuffs 
to the Polish Government as the rioters seemed to need 
bread. Dulles then phoned the Red Cross to see if they 
would be in a position to offer the proposed foodstuffs. 155 
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As its plan, drawn up after the East German riots in the 
case of a similar situation arising, called for, the United 
States officially remained quiet and made an offer of 
foodstuffs on 30 June through the International Red Cross. 
By 2 July, the American embassy in Poland sent a 
composite picture of the situation in Poland to the State 
Department. 156 It told of the hardships of the Poznan 
workers and how with wages cut they were unable to support 
themselves. The workers had asked for the government to 
address their problems, but the bureaucracy had either done 
nothing about the situation or had been too slow in acting. 
The embassy related that the demonstration was to have been 
peaceful, but that it became a mob due to the large number 
of people massed in the square, the authorities shooting 
over the crowd's heads, the emotional effect of singing the 
national anthem, the alleged killing of children during the 
firing of the warning shots, and the feeling of power the 
155Dulles call to Mr. smith, 29 June 1956, Box 5, 
Telephone Call Series, Dulles Papers. 
156us Embassy in Warsaw Telegram to the Secretary of 
State, 2 July 1956, Records of the Department of State 
Relating to the Internal Affairs of Poland, 1955-1959. 
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crowd experienced as it was their first large popular 
demonstration in Poland since the war. The embassy believed 
no food shortages existed in Poland, but that the bread 
slogans were merely a symbol for the roiters' inability to 
procure necessities. 
By 3 July the OCB and NSC had plans on how to deal with 
the riots. The OCB wanted the United States' offer of food 
to be given a lot of publicity as the riots were based on 
the dissatisfaction of the workers with the communist 
regime. As labor was the cause of the revolts, internation-
al labor could be involved, free elections under UN guidance 
in Poland and other satellite countries would be encouraged, 
and the United States would keep the propaganda offensive 
against the Soviet Union's efforts to pin the riot on the 
United States. The NSC policy number 5608, "United States 
Policy Towards the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe," 
remains largely classified, so any basic changes in strategy 
are unknown; however, it can be seen that an effort was made 
to maintain NSC 174 by trying to undermine Soviet prestige 
in the world and by trying to increase tensions between 
Poland and the Soviet Union. NSC 5608 also showed the 
increased importance of nationalism as reflected in the 
riot. 
The United States officially refrained from commenting 
on the riot, but it felt itself to be on a propaganda 
offensive. The riot demonstrated the success of the 
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administration's efforts.over the past three years to 
increase resistance to sovietization and its efforts were 
shown to have been effective through the anti-communist, 
anti-Russian slogans used by the rioters. Another issue to 
be exploited was the fact that it was the workers, whom the 
communists claimed to protect, who revolted against the 
regime. The government was going to use every governmental, 
private, and international organization it could in order to 
further reduce the Soviet Union's prestige and influence. 
As to the use of international organizations, the 
United States had already made the food offer through the 
International Red Cross, but the Polish Red Cross refused 
the offer as food was not needed. The United States decided 
to let the offer remain open. Ambassador Lodge was 
interested in using the UN as a forum for discussing the 
riot or even as a means of using direct action in Poland, 
such as creating a Peace Observation Commission to go to 
that country. Dulles was hesitant on the idea of a Peace 
Commission but he encouraged Lodge to mention the 
interference of the Soviet Union in Poland, the economic 
failures of the Soviet satellite system, and the violation 
of trade union rights in an upcoming UN meeting on "Survey 
of the World Economic Situation, Including the Question of 
Full Employment and the Expansion of World Trade.nm 
157Lodge to Dulles, 11 July 1956 and 16 July 1956, Box 
2, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, Dulles 
Papers; see also: State Department telegram to Murphy, 6 
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In an OCB meeting on 18 June, members discussed 
American action with regard to the Poznan riot, noting that 
USIA was collecting and using eyewitness accounts of the 
uprising. on 14 July the riot had been discussed at a NATO 
meeting, and Ambassador Lodge had mentioned the riot in a 
speech he gave at the UN. On 20 July Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, 
President of the International Peasant Union and Chairman of 
the Polish National Democratic Committee and the Polish 
Peasant Party, suggested that the Polish regime would follow 
a more moderate program if it felt the world was watching 
it; therefore, he recommended keeping pressure and attention 
on the situation there. 
Radio Free Europe concluded from the riot that 1) the 
Poznan demonstrators had been prepared to fight the 
communists, and 2) that the local armies were not all that 
reliable, as many soldiers had aided the rioters. Yet the 
station felt its responsibility was to avoid encouraging 
more bloody sacrifices. One of its first messages after it 
received news of the Poznan riot was the following: 
we understand and appreciate the motivations which 
have driven the workers of Poznan to desperate measures. 
However, riots and revolts are not likely to improve 
matters in Poland, for police may be given an oppor-
tunity for reprisals which may make things worse. No 
government which bases itself exclusively upon the tanks 
and bayonets of armed forces, will endure. But the 
July 1956, Records of the Depatment of state Relating to the 
Internal Affairs of Poland, 1955-1959. 
Polish people must husband their strength and hold on 
for the time of freedom. m 
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RFE, continuing to report the news as it occurred, addressed 
the Polish worker's problems and their government on the 
spot about the people it imprisoned as a result of the riot. 
As the workers had demonstrated for legitimate demands, RFE 
wanted to protect them against retaliation by the Polish 
government and called for open trials to be held. It als<.' 
helped to keep the listeners from feeling abandoned by the 
West, an important factor as further propaganda efforts 
would fail if the Polish people felt isolated. 159 Between 
29 June and 3 July, Radio Free Europe devoted ninety-four 
hours of programming to the Poznan riot and provided 
information to the people when they could not trust their 
own stations. The station continued to move towards its 
goal of preventing the integration of the Iron Curtain 
countries into the Soviet empire by preventing sovietization 
of the people, and felt as the United States Government did, 
that it was witnessing success in its endeavors. 
Meanwhile in Poland, the regime, admitting that the 
worl~ers grievances were justified, attempted to make some 
amends by returning 1,200,000 zlotys of the 11 million it 
owed. Julian Tokarski, Minister of the Auto and Tractor 
Industry, was ousted as he had been the man responsible for 
158Radio Free Europe and the Poznan Demonstrations, 6 
July 1956, Box 44, Jackson Papers. 
1590CB Meeting, FRUS, vol. 25, Eastern Europe, 222. 
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negotiations with the ZIPSO workers and he had not done his 
job. Tokarski had been told the workers would march if 
their grievances were not met, but he had not taken the 
warning seriously. The harsh rhetoric that the regime had 
used against the West immediately after the riot began to 
die down and by 28 July, one month after the riot, a change 
in tone occurred. Instead of attacking Dulles and the state 
Department for the propaganda campaign they were conducting, 
the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party 
stated that the riot had set the task for the Party of 
evaluating the sources and causes lying at its foundation. 
The PUWP planned to liquidate excessive centralizaton of 
planning and management, to raise the standard of living, to 
improve the supplies of materials, and to streamline their 
management. 1ro The regime took a new posture and it 
appeared that Mikolajczyk's suggestion to keep the pressure 
on Poland was actually bringing about more moderate 
policies. 
Proof was the trials of the people imp~isoned due to 
the riot. on 26 September, Eisenhower, concerned about 
these people as he feared reprisals, stated that he hoped 
for fair and open trials with a legal counsel to defend the 
prisoners and that they would be able to speak freely 
without fear of retribution. He challenged the Polish 
regime to show that it had abandoned Stalinist methods. 
irozinner, National Communism, 147. 
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Whatever the outcome of the trials, Eisenhower concluded, it 
was clear there would be no solution to the Polish situation 
until the people were given the opportunity to elect their 
own government, no matter what type of system that was. 161 
With an emphasis placed on fairness, the trials opened on 27 
September. The sentences meted out to those convicted in the 
first round were relatively mild; before long the trials 
were postponed and the accused permitted to return home. 
The other surprising event that demonstrated the 
liberalizing trend in Poland was not only the restoration of 
Wladyslaw Gomulka as a member of the Party on 4 August, but 
his ascent to the position of First Secretary by 15 
October. 162 The choice of Gomulka demonstrated that 
liberalization was genuinely occurring in Poland and that 
separate roads to socialism might actually be possible for a 
satellite country other than Yugoslavia. The example Tito 
set for the Poles cannot be underestimated, as he 
represented the possibility that other countries might 
resume control of their own affairs while sharing common 
doctrinal assumptions with Moscow. The Poles hoped to 
succeed, as Tito had, by convincing the Soviets that planned 
161
"United states Views on Polish Trials," The 
Department of state Bulletin, a October 1956, 552. 
162Al though a confirmed communist, he had been ousted 
from the Party as he had opposed Stalin's control of Polish 
affairs. For more on Gomulka: Nicholas William Bethell, 
Gomulka: His Poland and His Communism (Hammondsworth: 
Penguin, 1972). 
concessions only served to increase support for socialism 
and improve Polish-Soviet relations. 1~ 
The Polish Politburo knew it needed a policy popular 
with the masses that took into account national character-
istics, but that would not at the same time provoke Soviet 
intervention. Gomulka was a communist, but he was also 
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relatively popular and a Polish nationalist and the shift in 
the government raised urgent questions in Poland and in 
Moscow. In Poland, words were racing ahead of deeds as 
promises were made to the people of the availability of more 
consumer goods and passports to travel abroad. The problem 
was how the regime could meet these promises while the 
Soviet Union kept its army in Poland. 
In Moscow, the riot, Gomulka's rise to power, and the 
subsequent promises were raising too many undesired 
questions that had to be answered. On 19 October Khrushchev 
arrived in Warsaw in a bad mood and said to the Polish 
leaders: 
We have shed our blood to liberate this ~ountry, and 
now you want to hand it over to the Americans, but in 
this you will not succeed, this will not happen! 1M 
163For more on the Yugoslav influence on the Poznan 
revolt, see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc; Unity 
and Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). 
Brzezinski argues that de-Stalinization resulted in a rise 
in Polish nationalism, and that in the wake of Khrushchev's 
overtures to Tito, including the Soviet leader's 1955 visit 
to Belgrade, Poles wanted to be permitted to mark out and 
travel their own road to socialism as well. 
tMsyrop, spring in October, 94. 
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The United States government remained silent during these 
tense three days of Khrushchev's visit. Dulles said the 
contribution of the United states to the Poles was not "one 
of actual intervening and meddling, because that kind of 
thing ••• often is counter-productive." Rather, the United 
States' task was to "keep alive the concept of freedom" 
through the traditional theme of "conduct and example." 165 
Eisenhower, agreeing with Dulles' statement of the American 
plan, said the hearts of the American people went out to the 
people of Poland in their struggle to win freedom from 
Soviet domination. The United States, he continued, took 
freedom for granted, but these people knew how important it 
was and through the recent unrest, "they at least may have 
the opportunity to live under Governments of their own 
chaos ing • "166 
To some extent this became true. There would be no 
free elections in Poland, but the Soviet Union did allow 
Gomulka, a man chosen without prior Soviet approval, to stay 
in office. Gomulka was permitted to remain .because he 
continued to maintain his faith in the communist system and 
he had the support of the people due to his liberalizing and 
nationalistic sentiments. In this position, he hoped to 
steer Poland to increased independence from the Soviets 
165Michael A. Gubin, John Foster Dulles, A Statesman and 
His Times (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 178. 
166
"President Backs Poles' Struggle," New York Times, 21 
October 1956, 1. 
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without jeopardizing their alliance with the Soviet Union, 
and to continue this process towards increased 
democratization. 
The United States welcomed the news of the changes that 
Gomulka hoped to make as they mirrored American objectives 
of increased independence for Poland and of decreasing the 
power and prestige of the Soviet Union. On 23 October, the 
Department of State planning staff came up with a list of 
actions the United States should take to aid the process of 
Gomulka's rise to power. The United States was to make 
quietly known to the Polish regime Washington's willingness 
to furnish economic assistance (the United States did not 
insist on a break with Moscow}; employ a policy of 
restraint--America approved of increased independence but 
did not expect to gain from it by increasing its own 
position there; and ready an appeal to the UN in case of 
Soviet intervention. 167 The administration felt 
particularly strong about the second proposal and attributed 
to this posture the Soviet Union's willingness to accept 
Gomulka as the United States was not ready to jump into 
Poland. 
USIA, following a policy similar to that of Radio Free 
Europe's of not inciting further revolts, avoided any: 
(1} direct ID of United States policy with the present 
resurgence of Polish nationalism 
167Department of State Policy Planning Staff, FRUS, vol. 
25, Eastern Europe, 259-60. 
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(2) statement Poles might resent as outside interference 
(3) reference to recent events as the breaking up of the 
Soviet bloc 
(4) speculation that Poland represents the future doom 
of communism168 
There were no further revolts in Poland; however, 
influenced by Yugoslavia and Poland, Hungary sought its own 
road to socialism. Unlike the situation in Poland, the 
Hungarian outburst in Budapest, beginning 23 October 1956, 
was revolutionary in character and aimed for more than a 
mere nationalist communist government. It sought inter-
national neutrality and a withdrawal from the.Warsaw Pact 
agreement. Unable to tolerate such an attack on their Great 
Power status, the Soviets invaded Hungary on 4 November, 
forcefully put down the revolution, and regained control 
over the country. The extreme violence in Hungary caused 
the American administration to stand firm on its decision to 
remain as quiet and proceed as cautiously during the events 
in Hungary as it had during the past riots in Berlin and 
Poznan. 169 
168Ibid., 271. 
169For more on Hungary and the Polish-Hungarian 
connection, see: Ambrose, Eisenhower, 354; Noel Barber, 
Seven Days of Freedom: The Hungarian Uprising 1956 (London: 
MacMillan, 1973); Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, Hungary 
1956 revisited: The Message of a Revolution A Quarter 
Century After (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1983}; Andor Heller, 
No More comrades (Chicago: H. Regency, 1957); Melvin J. 
Laskey, ed., The Hungarian Revolution; A White Book. The 
story of the October Uprising as Recorded in Documents, 
Dispatches, Eye-Witness Accounts and World-Wide Reactions 
(New York: Praeger, 1957); Richard Lettis and William E. 
Morris, The Hungarian Revolt, October 23-November 4 (New 
York: Scribner, 1961); William Lomax, Hungary 1956 (New 
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By 31 October the NSC had a plan to deal with the 
restless satellite countries. NSC 5616, an "Interim United 
States Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary," 
addressed the importance of encouraging "national" communist 
governments. Gomulka was representative of this type of 
government, embodying the nationalistic, anti-Russian 
sentiment of the people with the realitles of the presence 
of the Soviet troops. Courses of action included: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
United States willingness to discuss problems 
affecting United States-Polish relations 
increased economic relations, and encouraging the 
Poles to put their energies into satisfying consumer 
demands and peaceful trade 
encourage the government to fulfill commitments of 
reform made to the public 
increased economic, scientific, and cultural 
contacts170 
Eisenhower spoke before the nation the same day about the 
recent developments in Eastern Europe and, following NSC 
5616 guidelines, he encouraged "national" communist 
governments: "A few days ago, the people of Poland with 
their proud and deathless devotion to freedom moved to 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1976); Tibor Meray, 13 Days that 
Shook the World trans. by Howard L. Katzander, (New York: 
Praeger, 1959); Miklos Molnar, Budapest 1956: A History of 
the Hungarian Revolution trans. by Jennetta Ford, (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1971); David Pryce-Jones, The Hungarian 
Revolution (New York: Horizon Press, 1970); Janos Radvanyi, 
Hungary and the Superpowers; The 1956 Revolution and 
Realpolitik (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1972); Paul 
E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1962). 
1701nterim u. s. Policy on Developments in Poland and 
Hungary, 19 November 1956, Box 19, NSC Series, Office of the 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. 
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secure a peaceful transition to a new government. And this 
government, it seems, will strive genuinely to serve the 
Polish people." The Soviets issued a statement yesterday171 
and appear willing to revise their policies to meet the 
demand for greater national independence and personal 
freedom. If the Soviets act on this statement of intent, it 
will be the greatest stride forward toward justice, trust 
and understanding among nations. In conclusion, Eisenhower 
reaffirmed that the United states had no ulterior motive 
with regard to Poland, but merely wanted it to be able to 
choose its own form of government. 172 
Dulles, speaking on 12 November before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, stated: "It had been the bases 
of United States policy that the Soviet satellites should be 
liberated, not by the force of foreign arms, but by the 
relentless pressure of the demand of men to be free." By 
keeping alive their love of freedom and hope of liberation, 
Poland now had Gomulka's regime, 11 ••• [a] shift away from 
Soviet domination, and it has shown its ability to insist on 
171The soviet statement Eisenhower ref erred to was made 
over Moscow radio. It recalled that the Twentieth Congress 
of the CPSU condemned mistakes and violations and demanded 
that the soviet Union apply Lenin's principles of equality 
of nations in its relations with other states. It said there 
were mistakes in the establishment of the new regime, 
"including some in relations between the socialist states-
violations and mistakes which infringed the principles of 
equality in relation between socialist states. 
17211Developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East," 
The Department of state Bulletin, 12 November 1956, 743-45. 
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greater control of internal affairs. 11 173 By 21 December, 
the United States considered Poland a "friendly nation" as 
it was no longer "dominated" or "controlled" by the soviet 
Union. Talk of American economic aid progressed accordingly. 
As the year drew to an end, Eisenhower was re-elected 
for a second term with a 3 million vote increase over his 
1952 majority. 174 Once again he had run again against Adlai 
Stevenson of Illinois, who had called the Republican policy 
of liberation nothing but "bluster and bluff." Despite this 
charge, Eisenhower won due to his continuing popularity and 
to the fact that during times of crises, the American people 
tend to choose to stay with the present administration. 
Although the liberation of Eastern Europe had not been 
achieved, Poland had changed; a totalitarian regime had now 
been replaced by national communists. As Eisenhower said in 
a speech on 31 October: 
A few days ago, the people of Poland--with their proud 
and deathless devotion to freedom--moved to secure a 
peaceful transition to a new government. And this 
government, it seems, will strive to serve the Polish 
people. 175 
At the end of 1956, the United states remained 
cautious. A state Department national intelligence estimate 
173united States Senate, Executive Sessions of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 84th Cong., 2d sess.,12 
November 1956, 608. 
174Johnson, National Party Platforms, 523. 
175Podell and Anzovin, Speches of the American 
Presidents, 580. 
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concluded that the Soviet Union would continue its policy of 
shifting between repression and concession for the sake of 
expediency •176 It was predicted that Moscow would again use 
repression as a means of control, but for the time being, at 
least, Poland had gained some breathing space. 
t7611probable Developments in Soviet-Satellite 
Relations, 11 FRUS, vol. 25, Eastern Europe, 83. 
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CONCLUSION 
Dwight Eisenhower won the 1952 presidential election in 
part because of his clarion call for a "rollback" of Soviet 
power in the countries of Eastern Europe. Critics 
subsequently argued that Eisenhower failed in his plans for 
a "rollback," or liberation, but an analysis of National 
Security Council papers shows liberation for what it was: a 
call used to gain public favor for his policies vis-a-vis 
the communist world, rather than the long-term goal. The 
years 1953 to 1956 provided many opportunities for a change 
in East-West relations, beginning with Stalin's death and 
the East German uprising in 1953, continuing with the Geneva 
conference in July 1955, and ending with th~ Polish riot in 
Poznan in June 1956. The United States, initially surprised 
by the events of 1953, quickly formulated NSC 174, a plan 
concerning Eastern Europe that would guide official American 
policy for the next three years. 
Introduced on 11 December 1953, NSC 174 recognized de 
facto soviet control over the satellite countries, but 
observed that these same countries simultaneously prevented 
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the Moscow from consolidating its power in the region. NSC 
174 aimed at encouraging resistance to Soviet domination in 
the short term and the elimination of soviet influence in 
the long term. The United States did not want to risk a 
general war to achieve the ultimate goal of liberation, but 
the short-term aims of creating problems for the Soviets in 
their own backyard were easier to carry out. The 
administration concluded that the best means to effect 
change was by psychological warfare, and by 1956, propaganda 
and policy were so closely tied together that one could not 
readily be distinguished from the other. 
The reason for focusing on psychological warfare versus 
conventional diplomatic activities was that this was how 
Eisenhower planned to attain his long-term aim of libera-
tion. Relations with the Polish regime could at best be 
described as formally correct, but were usually tense and 
very difficult. The United States, learning from the East 
German riots in 1953 that diplomacy would not achieve 
liberation, enacted NSC 158, but this was merely a list of 
interim objectives and actions until a formal policy could 
be formed. That formal policy was outlined in NSC 174, 
which clearly stated that liberation was the long-term goal 
of the administration. 
Humanitarian aid, the Voice of America, Radio Free 
Europe, and numerous other propaganda and informational 
organizations were some of the tools employed by the United 
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States in attempting to free Eastern Europe from the Soviet 
bear•s formidable embrace. As there were no means by which 
the United States could measure the success of its policy in 
concrete terms, many critics initially concluded that 
Eisenhower's goal of liberation had met with only limited 
success, if not outright failure. The proof that his 
policies helped pave the way for the eventual liberation of 
the satellites came with the Polish riot in Poznan in June 
1956. 
For some the fact that the Polish uprising did not 
result in a democratic government or rid the country of 
soviet influence pointed to the failure of liberation. I 
argue that this is an inaccurate view. As mentioned above, 
liberation was not NSC 174's, or President Eisenhower's 
immediate goal--regardless of what the public thought. 
American policy aimed at increasing difficulties for the 
communists and resisting sovietization. And the Polish 
riots demonstrated just how effective American government 
policy had been. They certainly offered undeniable proof of 
the depth of the people's hatred of communism and of the 
soviet Union. They also showed that through resistance 
people might achieve some independence from Moscow--the 
right to travel their own road to socialism. The people of 
Poland were not yet free, but they had resisted the Russian 
bear and won a measure of autonomy. This was the first step 
on the road toward eventual liberation. 
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